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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. Navy’s supply chain stretches globally, supporting the fleet in multiple 
theaters to enable sustained forward presence, security, and deterrence. However, supply 
chains are subject to disruptions that slow materiel movements throughout the network, 
and these disruptions may severely hinder the readiness of ships operating in distant 
theaters. A common culprit for peacetime supply chain disruptions is adverse weather, 
which is especially true in waters that are prone to major tropical storm systems. Other 
disruptions may include failure of equipment, accidents, and adversarial activity during 
active conflict situations. With these concerns in mind, this thesis formulates six 
optimization models to assist logistics planners in preparing for and responding to these 
uncertain contingencies. The models we present fall into both a proactive family, which 
plan for disruptions based on their likelihood before they occur, and a reactive family, 
which respond to the disruptions as they occur. To address the probabilistic risks of 
disruptions, these models utilize linear integer programming, chance constraints 
programming, and dynamic programming in different ways, seeking to demonstrate 
various methods for routing supplies through a network vulnerable to random disruptions. 
Lastly, we analyze results to determine the suitability of these models in several 
disruption scenarios. 
v 
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Executive Summary
The U.S. Navy supply chain, like other transportation networks, is subject to disruption
that may impede the flow of supplies to customers in forward deployed locations. During
peacetime, disruptive events, in the form of complete breaks or temporary delays, may
range from poor weather conditions to reduced access to facilities or infrastructure due to
unforeseen circumstances. Some examples of major disruptive events that have occurred
include volcanic ash resulting in partial or total disruption of air traffic, labor disputes
halting shipping terminal activities, industrial accidents damaging port facilities, natural
phenomenon such as seismic activity, and cyberattacks or other random computer outages.
The time that it takes to restore infrastructure, together with finite airport apron capacity,
seaport berths, and supporting equipment, affect operational schedules.
To mitigate disruption, the goal of this thesis is to propose solutions for two problems: (a)
How to forecast and plan the routing of supplies through a supply network to minimize
risks of delay caused by potential disruption, and (b) How to best respond to a disruption
after it occurs. The first problem may be addressed by using proactive models, where the
approach is “here-and-now” and optimal routing is determined prior to possible disruption,
with the objective of planning in advance. The second problem may be addressed by using
reactive models, where the approach is “wait-and-see” and optimal routing is modified as a
response to a realized disruption.
We develop six optimization models, five proactive models and one reactive, which ad-
dress the time of delivery as well as the probability of successfully overcoming possible
disruptions. We compare accuracy and effectiveness of these models and test them under a
hypothetical, yet plausible, scenario. This scenario involves several airports, seaports, and
connecting lines of communication, both inside and outside the area where disruptions may
occur.
We model disruptions as random occurrences with known or estimated probabilities. This
assumption is more suitable for a disruption due to natural causes such as weather than
disruption due to interdiction by an adversary. The latter better fits contested situations
where strategic, game-theoretic considerations are more appropriate.
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Our goal is to deliver items through the supply network to a demand location as quickly as
possible. When the network is not subject to disruptions, this problem is a standard network
shortest path problem. However, since we are interested in networks subject to possible
disruptions, the travel times along the arcs are random variables. Due to this fact, some of
the routes to the demand location may take a moderate amount of time with near certainty,
while more direct routes may take much less time under perfect conditions, but are at risk
to be significantly extended by disruptions.
The reactivemodel, called ReOpt, solves a standard shortest path problem, whilemonitoring
and responding to network changes over time. As materiel is routed to the next node in the
network, if the modeled network changes due to a disruption, then the algorithm recognizes
this change and re-optimizes with the updated data to find the new shortest path.
The five proactive models are: MinT_R (linear integer programming), MinR_T (linear
integer programming), CCP (chance constraints programming), DP-Time (dynamic pro-
gramming), and DP-Risk (dynamic programming). The inherent randomness associated
with disruptions is considered by each of these models.
ReOpt is the only reactive model of the six formulated. This model solves the basic shortest
path optimization problem to find the fastest route to the demand location and begins to
follow it. If a disruption occurs on the way to the demand location, then the model takes
the new travel times in the network as an input and re-calculates the shortest path to the
same end node. This process occurs for any disruption in the network until the shipment
reaches the demand location. The travel times used in the optimization calculation for this
model are always the current best-case travel times, so the model ignores possible future
disruptions, assuming none will occur.
MinT_R and MinR_T are twin models that share traits. Both of the two employ linear
integer programming to find an optimal route to the demand node. MinT_R minimizes the
total time to deliver a shipment subject to a constraint on the probability of encountering a
disruption along the chosen route. On the other hand, MinR_T minimizes the probability of
encountering a disruption subject to a maximum delivery deadline after which the supplies
are useless. Therefore, both optimization models are related in that the constraint in one
model is the objective function in the other and vice-versa.
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CCP seeks to minimize the delivery time to the demand location subject to a probability
threshold regarding the feasibility of that delivery time. That is if the probability threshold
is 0.8, CCP model returns the route with the best 80th percentile travel time.
Finally, the two dynamic programming models, DP-Time and DP-Risk seek to find optimal
routes and contingency plans given certain disruptions occur. DP-Time provides the best
next node to travel to from each node in the network at any time in order to arrive at the
demand location in the lowest expected time. DP-Risk provides the optimal next node to
travel to in order to provide the highest probability that the shipment reaches the demand
location within a deadline set out in advance.
All of these six models are implemented on several scenarios in a notional real-world
network in order to gather some insight to their comparative advantages and disadvantages.
The hypothetical scenario used for implementation in this thesis involves a major conflict
called Global War 2030 and the major theater of operations is in the Philippine Sea. The
logistical support in this scenario involves delivery of supplies from Hawaii to hypothetical
U.S. installations within the Philippines. In this scenario, the Philippines contain several
U.S. installations such as forward command centers, anti-ship missile installations, air
defense sites, and expeditionary air fields along the first island chain. These are important
locations for the campaign, which require a continuous stream of resupplies. Materiel is
shipped through the sea routes and air routes of the theater, from Hawaii through the large
port cities of Cebu or Manila, Philippines. From Cebu or Manila, the supplies are further
distributed in the theater across the islands to the installations, which are the final customers.
All steps of this supply chain use multiple delivery methods, which may have differing times
to delivery, risks, or costs of use.
Three different cases of weather patterns, of increasing severity, were used to create dis-
ruptions. These cases each presented different results that, when analyzed provide insights
into each model’s benefits and drawbacks in dealing with disruptions as well as their com-
putational complexity and feasibility of implementations.
First, the one reactive model ReOpt has one major shortcoming: it assumes that there will
be no future disruptions, and so it always uses the baseline travel time to find the fastest
route through the network. While it makes no assumptions about the type of disruptions
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or their independence, assuming that disruptions will not occur can result in the model
choosing a highly risky arc, which could otherwise be avoided.
Next, the twin proactive models MinT_R and MinR_T share the same drawback in their
handling of potential disruptions in that they treat any possible disruption as a binary event
that has a catastrophic outcome, rendering the arc unusable. In addition, in their current
formulation, all of the disruptions must be independent and cannot be dependent upon each
other. However, the benefit of these models is their low computational complexity and the
ubiquity of common software that may be used to solve for an optimal route. Both of these
models can be easily implemented in Excel using the solver add-in to generate optimal
routes.
CCP has few drawbacks when implemented in a more general way than in this thesis. The
benefits that CCP provides include the ability to generalize it to a disruption probabilities
that are dependent across arcs as well as probability distributions that are continuous, not
discrete. In addition, CCP allows a decision maker to tune the model to their preferred
level of risk averseness. The largest major drawback is computational complexity and
difficulty of implementation. CCP’s computational complexity can grow quite quickly
as the size of the network and the number of possible disruptions, and a more advanced
programming solution is needed to enumerate the possible network outcomes than simple
generally available software.
For DP-Time, the shortcomings include treating disruptions as having discrete probability
distributions and also using the expected value of delivery time as the objective value,
making it vulnerable to be skewed by unlikely, but extreme, disruptions. The compounding
computational complexity for larger problems and the need for a more advanced implemen-
tation, not available as a standard software product, are also detriments for DP-Time. The
benefits are the very fast computation time for smaller problems as well as the fact that it
provides a solution that is risk-neutral and gives the total expected travel time. In addition,
this model only needs one iteration in the network, and it provides a road map for each
possible situation that could occur before the time horizon.
Finally, DP-Risk is limited by treating the disruptions as having discrete and independent
probability distributions. We also note that the computational burden can become high as
the problem grow and requires a specific implementation programmed for this purpose like
xviii
DP-Time. However, the benefit of using the probability of delivery prior to a deadline as
the objective is that this gives decision makers a better idea of the length of time necessary
to reach their own threshold of comfort for a successful delivery.
Each model that we examine in this thesis has strengths and weaknesses that could be
relevant to decision makers who seek an effective route in a network subject to disruptions.
Though there is not one best model to use always, each of the models gives a different
approach to model disruptions and together they present several alternatives. Decision
makers can evaluate the routes presented by these models and their associated metrics and
then choose which model’s solution might be best for a given situation.
xix
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Logistical support is crucial to the success of most military operations and allows the U.S.
Armed Forces to maintain operational flexibility and superiority. Our focus is on U.S.
Navy logistics and how to maximize the likelihood of effectively supporting ships, aircraft,
and personnel deployed around the world. In order to sustain operations, military systems
and personnel require an assortment of supplies, including subsistence items, ammunition,
repair parts, medical supplies, and other commodities. Some, but not all, of these supplies
may either be carried or be acquired locally. Degradations to a supply network may interfere
with the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate effectively in a forward theater. This thesis addresses
the possibility of disruptions in a supply network and proposes ways to respond to such
disruptions.
1.1 Logistics Background
A supply chain is essentially a sequence of actions, at different interconnected locations,
with a common goal to provide required quantities of materiel to customers both where
and when needed. A supply chain is frequently represented by a network consisting of
nodes, each representing a specific real location or virtual location, and connecting arcs,
each representing a specific line of communication (LOC). A real location may be fixed
or mobile. A virtual location is defined as a moment along a journey that serves as a
waypoint where the current action in the supply chain can be amended or continued, and
there could be arbitrarily many of them along each LOC. Military supply chains consist
of many LOCs serving as arcs that link forces who are deployed globally together with
inter-theater and intra-theater intermediate nodes, with originating facilities located inside
the U.S., U.S. territories, or other support locations. These LOCs may be a mix of air
lines of communication (ALOCs), ground lines of communication (GLOCs), rail lines of
communication (RLOCs), or sea lines of communication (SLOCs), so named by the mode
of transport used in each case.
With naval logistics in particular, the network of ALOCs, GLOCs, and SLOCs connects
different ports and areas in need of supplies using both forward logistics sites, located
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near seaports for the SLOCs, and advanced logistic support sites, located near airfields for
the ALOCs, which together serve as temporary staging and transshipment locations. The
structure of the Navy supply chain is inherently dynamic—customer ships and supporting
auxiliary ships are not stationary, with each ship changing location over time. Additionally,
the risk of threats to the network arcs and nodes may change over time, as explained in the
next subsection.
Logistical support is increasingly important to the U.S. Navy, due to high operational tempo,
the nature of deployed missions globally, and distributed maritime operations conducted in
remote regions. Due to uncertain schedules and timing, supplies may not always simply be
sent to the next naval base or port of call where a ship is anticipated to reach; underway
replenishment, in which supplies are delivered to ships without any need for the ship to
return to port, is often necessary to sustain a ship’s mission with minimal interruption. An
additional constraint is that each ship has limited stowage for supplies and fuel and therefore
requires multiple replenishment events while deployed.
Fuel specifically is vital forU.S. Navy ships to sustain forward presence andmaneuverability.
According to one study in Lengyel (2007), as of 2007 the U.S. Navy accounts for 33% of
the U.S. government’s total fuel usage. In a report from U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift
Command (MSC), the total petroleum product delivery in the year 2018 was 10,026,221
barrels indicating that the U.S. Navy burns about 421 million gallons of fuel each year,
averaging to almost 1.15 million gallons of fuel per day (MSC 2018). This massive fuel
consumption is critical to international naval operations and could be damaged due to supply
chain disruptions.
U.S. Navy logistics is maintained by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readi-
ness and Logistics (OPNAV N4), whose staff is tasked with overseeing readiness require-
ments and logistics support for naval forces. OPNAVN4 controls a budget of approximately
$15 Billion with which they work to fulfill their mission by providing strategic-level support
to operational units around the world (U.S. Navy 2019).
Logistics in the U.S. Navy operates as part of the joint doctrine of the armed forces, working
to supply all of the military assets around the world. Joint Publication 4-0 tells the reader
that organized and effective logistics is necessary to provide sustainment of military assets
enabling further reach of operational assets as well as an operational advantage over lesser
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supplied adversaries around the world, and reliability of consistent support to military assets
for highly predictable and time-efficient replenishment (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2019). Indeed,
it includes a quote by General Eisenhower: “You will not find it difficult to prove that
battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”
1.2 Disruptions
The U.S. Navy supply chain, like other transportation networks, is subject to disruption
that may impede the flow of supplies to operational units and personnel in various forward
deployed locations. Disruptive events, in the form of complete breaks or temporary delays,
may range from poor weather conditions to reduced access to facilities or infrastructure due
to unforeseen circumstances. Some examples of major disruptive events that have occurred
include volcanic ash resulting in partial or total disruption of air traffic, labor disputes
halting shipping terminal activities, industrial accidents damaging port facilities, natural
phenomenon such as seismic activity, and cyberattacks or other random computer outages.
The time that it takes to restore infrastructure, together with finite airport apron capacity,
seaport berths, and supporting equipment, may or may not support operational schedules.
A foreseeable example of a disruptive threat that the U.S. Navy supply chain might face
is a tropical cyclone. These weather systems form in ocean basins globally, including the
Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean, occurring both during specific
seasons and year-round. Specifically near the islands of the Philippines and throughout the
Pacific Ocean, there exist common tropical cyclone formation areas which vary in frequency
and intensity of storms produced each year, with greater numbers produced during the peak
months of June through November (OPNAVN4 2019). Weaker weather systems may
develop into much stronger hurricanes, typhoons, or cyclonic storms, depending on the
region affected. During a severe typhoon season in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, for
example, multiple “super typhoons” could develop simultaneously, as was the case in
October 2009 when Super Typhoon Parma and Super TyphoonMelor struck the Philippines
and Japan, respectively (Cooper and Falvey 2009). Unpredictable, high activity storm
seasons likely will continue to be a concern for the U.S. Navy to sustain forces deployed
globally.
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Additionally, military supply chains risk disruption from an adversary’s intentional actions
to degrade logistical capabilities. U.S. Navy leadership is interested in success across
a range of military operations, regardless of scale, from a peaceful presence mission to a
declaredwar (Richardson 2018). Disruptionmay threaten information accuracy, sequencing
of events, reliability of equipment, and visibility throughout the enterprise, which are all
vital to military planning and operational success.
To mitigate disruption, the goal of this thesis is to propose solutions for two problems: (a)
How to forecast and plan the routing of supplies through a supply network to minimize
risks of delay caused by potential disruption, and (b) How to best respond to a disruption
after it occurs. The first problem may be addressed by using proactive models, where the
approach is “here-and-now” and optimal routing is determined prior to possible disruption,
with the objective of planning in advance. The second problem may be addressed by using
reactive models, where the approach is “wait-and-see” and optimal routing is modified as a
response to a realized disruption.
1.3 Scope
We develop multiple models, both proactive and reactive, which attempt to optimize the
likelihood that shipments will reach a destination under the threat of possible disruptions.
We compare accuracy and effectiveness of these models and test them under a hypothetical
scenario. This scenario involves several airports, seaports, and connecting LOCs, both
inside and outside the area where disruptions may occur.
We model disruptions as random occurrences with known or notional probabilities. The
analyses presented may therefore be more suitable for disruption due to weather than for
interdiction by an adversary, for example.
Prior studies develop mixed integer linear program optimization models of the U.S. Navy
supply chain (Colburn 2015) and (Krenz 2018). These studies ask if auxiliary ship con-
figurations more suited to contested maritime environments could still meet logistical re-
quirements. Our research differs in that our modeling explicitly considers threats that might
prevent shipments from reaching a destination. Disruptions may affect military supply
chains in different ways, such as delaying movement of materiel along one or more routes
within a transportation network or eliminating the use of infrastructure or routes altogether.
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The models that we describe in this thesis address potential disruptions, both proactively
and reactively. These models may be useful to logistics planners to help anticipate, respond
to, and mitigate the impacts of supply chain disruptions.
1.4 Methodology
This thesis presents six optimization models for routing materiel across a transportation
network in the presence of possible disruptions on the arcs and nodes of the network. One
of the six models is reactive, while the rest are proactive.
The reactive model solves the standard shortest path problem from an origin to a destination,
however the model’s algorithm also monitors and responds to network changes. As materiel
is routed to the next node in the network using a time-stepped process, if themodeled network
changes due to a disruption, then the algorithm recognizes this change and re-optimizes
with the updated data to find the new shortest path.
The five proactive models include standard linear integer optimization, chance constraints
programming, and dynamic programming. The inherent randomness associated with dis-
ruptions is considered by each of these models.
Two of the proactivemodelsmay be characterized as standard linear integer optimization and
were developed from models outlined previously (Washburn and Kress 2009). One of these
models seeks to minimize expected total time for shipments to reach a destination, subject
to a minimal accepted probability that the shipments will reach the destination without
disruption. The second of these models seeks to maximize the probability that shipments
will avoid disruption along the selected path, subject to a delivery time constraint.
The third proactive model utilizes chance constraints programming (CCP) to find the fastest
route that can be achieved with a certain minimum probability threshold (Charnes and
Cooper 1959). Following an efficient enumeration of all paths that meet the probability
threshold regarding arc travel times, the model finds the shortest path among them.
Finally, we present two dynamic programming (DP) models (Bellman 1957). Both use
the method of dynamic programming to optimize the route to the final destination by
choosing the best next location based on current and future conditions. Similarly to the
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first two proactive models, one minimizes travel time, while the other maximizes the total
probability that the shipment reaches the demand node within a set time limit.
1.5 Literature Review
We find sufficient recent research about supply chain flexibility, resilience, and the negative
effects that disruptions may have on supply chain operations generally. Some papers
describe methods to model a supply chain under the potential risk of disruptions, but few
address the topic of adapting to disruptive events as they occur or anticipating these events
so as to reduce damage and preserve a supply chain. The following section is an overview
of relevant works within these domains.
Before proposing how to achieve a resilient supply chain, wemust first define themeaning of
this term. Much of the discussion in current literature focuses on defining and characterizing
resilience in supply chains and on ways to achieve these desired characteristics. Michelman
(2007) likens a resilient supply chain to one that exhibits the materials science definition
of resilience in that it can “recover its original shape following a deformation”. Adapting
this definition to a supply chain suggests that it will continue to function following a new
pressure or disruptive event, or as Elleuch et al. (2016) paraphrase Jean-Jaques Laville,
“resilience is the ability to return to a stable state after disturbance.”
Michelman (2007) and Elleuch et al. (2016) provide different examples of resilient supply
chain traits. They seem to agree that common traits include agility and speed of recovery,
limited vulnerability to internal or external hazards, as well as flexibility to changing
conditions that affect the flow of supplies, such as unexpected changes in demand or network
disruptions. An important trait of resilient supply chains is that agility and timeliness must
persist post-disturbance. Elleuch et al. (2016) highlight the need to acknowledge risks and
vulnerabilities, because vulnerable nodes and arcs can cause serious damage to a supply
chain’s effectiveness. To design a resilient network, one must understand the criticality
of each node, together with the density and complexity of the system. Kamalahmadi and
Parast (2002) note that minimizing the number of critical nodes can mitigate the effect of a
disruption to a network.
Kamalahmadi and Parast (2002) and Elleuch et al. (2016) describe the concept of flexibility
as it relates to resiliency. Supply chain flexibility is a broad topic that includesmany different
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subcategories and may be described as a combination of adaptability of a system to changes,
redundancy within given resource constraints, and anticipation of possible hazards.
Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa (2018) describe adaptability as a condition wherein alternative
methods exist to readily re-establish flow after a disruption, thus adaptability is linked
to anticipation of supply chain disturbances. Further, Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa (2018)
explain that anticipating supply chain hazards and planning alternative courses of actionmay
help to lessen harm from potential disturbances. This applies to military supply networks
in a variety of ways, to include identifying possible disruptive events that could negatively
impact operations and developing contingency plans to use in lieu of original plans. Xu
et al. (2015) describe attacker/defender network problems, which are particularly relevant to
military supply chains due to the likelihood of network interference by an adversary during
hostilities.
In addition, several papers such as Xu et al. (2015), Jin et al. (2010), Rong et al. (2009)
and Wu et al. (2007) demonstrate ways to use mathematical modelling to explore the
impact of network perturbations and disruptions on large supply chains. This research is
especially relevant, as supply lines have gotten longer and networks more complex with a
more globalized economy, and as computing power has become larger and cheaper. Next
we look at these individual papers that deal with models that explore effects of perturbations
to the network structures.
Some work on improving and analyzing network resilience is presented in Clark (2017)
and Ross (2014). While both use attacker/defender problem optimization to analyze a
network’s resilience, Ross (2014) adds an optimization model for random hazards as well.
However, these studies are both focused on reinforcing the network structure in order to
protect against possible interdictions or disruptions, while this thesis instead maintains its
focus on optimizing the route through a network under threats of random disruptions, rather
than defending arcs against disruptions.
Rong et al. (2009) assert that a key aspect of modeling the impact of any single disruption
is the “bullwhip” effect (also known as “whiplash”, “whipsaw”, or “Forrester” effect). This
effect is a phenomenon by which small fluctuations in endpoint demand tend to amplify as
they move away from the customer in a supply chain (Bowman 1963). Similarly, supply
disruptions (i.e. scarcity) may result in a reversal of the effect, thereby amplifying changes
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in supply away from the manufacturer and destabilizing a system even further. In the context
of amilitary supply chain, a related examplemight occur if an end user suspects that materiel
will not arrive on time and trust in the supply chain is lost. A duplicate order may then
be initiated, further stressing the system. An end user may also decide to needlessly hoard
materiel rather than risk ordering an item only when it is required.
Wu et al. (2007) apply an uncertainty-basedmodel to observe the effects of safety buffers and
disruptions on a simulated network’s performance. The model used in this study employs
a mathematical modeling tool known as a Petri net, which is a network represented by a
bipartite graph with specified configurations. This method uses movable tokens to observe
the concurrent performances of various parts of a large, interconnected system (Peterson
1977). One strength in concurrently observing many parts of a large network is to study
the development of a disruption over time, versus merely the final outcome. This research,
however, does not address disruptive events that may be important in a military conflict
with potential strategic attacks coming from intelligent adversaries.
Xu et al. (2015) demonstrates possible modelling of the disruptions to a supply chain as an
attacker-defender game in order to prevent large amounts of damage to a military logistical
system from a targeted attack. This paper considers the defender as the in-zone receiver of
the supplies and provides three separate possible strategies that the defender could employ
prior to attacks, changing the optimization model representing the attack. The model uses
optimization to consider the effects an attack that results in a network disruption and a
follow-up contest between the two sides. The paper analyzes each of the three strategies and
a baseline of an unprepared supply chain as well as the outcomes of the follow-up contest is
compared in each scenario. The model takes a simplified look at supply chains with a single
resource on each side of the game and no current adaptability of strategies for each player.
Xu et al. (2015) further shows that the defender optimizes its expected payoff in the final
contest by allocating resources to defend its supply chain and thus notes the importance of
supply chain risk management in a military application.
Jin et al. (2010) use Monte Carlo methods in order to model a wargame in which a
government responds to terrorist’s attacks on the government’s supply chain. In this game,
both players have a utility function and attempt to maximize their expected utilities under
uncertainty regarding the delay time incurred by the attack, the time that a supplier remains
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down after the attack, and time between attacks. These three time parameters are random
variables with known distributions. The model is similar to the attacker-defender model
described above, and the model’s goal is to show the impact of inventory management
policies on the government’s utility.
All of these studies are potentially applicable to the question of how to best model supply
chain disruptions in general as well as non-deterministic disruptions and strategic attacks.
However, none of the studies explored possibilities for adaptable logistics strategies within
the scenario. The latter is particularly interesting to the question of ensuring logistic
flexibility in a supply chain. Possible extensions to allow for adaptable strategies in a Petri
network involve examining the impact of embedded agents who can detect or possibly
predict, with some probability, a disruption (Wu et al. 2007).
1.6 Thesis Structure
Following this chapter, this thesis expands on themethods used aswell as implementations of
the models developed to route supplies in a network. Chapter 2 presents the formulations for
six models and describes their mechanism of operation. Chapter 3 presents a basic realistic
implementation for the models using a notional supply chain network in a hypothetical
scenario. Chapter 4 takes into account the results from the implementations of the models
and draws conclusions about their performances relative to one another.
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In this chapter, we formulate several optimization models that solve the following problem:
how to optimally route an item from a source location to a demand location under the
possibility of disruptions that cause delays. These models use variations on three methods
of optimization: linear integer programming, dynamic programming, and chance constraints
programming. This chapter first presents an overview ofmathematical network optimization
in Section 2.1 followed by descriptions and mathematical formulations of optimization
models in order of increasing complexity in Sections 2.2 – 2.4.
2.1 Overview
The models described in this chapter route supplies through a network that may experience
random disruptions. Although the models all solve the same routing problem in different
ways, they share many common elements including the structure of the network. Each
network consists of nodes: positions in the network that may be source nodes from where
the flow of supplies starts, sink nodes which are the destinations to which they must be
delivered, or transshipment nodes which just serve as intermediate locations along the way
to reach the sink nodes. The network also has arcs which serve to connect nodes to one
another and act as paths along which the supplies move between nodes. Figure 2.1 shows
a simple example of a network with six nodes and eight arcs indicating possible directed
flow from source node A (start), where a shipment originates, to destination node F, where
there is a demand.
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Figure 2.1. A basic network with a starting point at node A and destination
at node F. Arrows represent typical flow directions.
Each arc in the network is associated with a cost for a shipment to travel along that arc,
from one node to the next. Often the cost represents the time of travel along that arc or
the financial cost to transport items on that arc. In the models we present in this thesis,
both types of “cost” apply. However, we focus on minimizing the amount of time taken to
transport the supplies to the destination.
When there are possibilities of disruptions, the travel times are not known and could take
longer than the original estimate. For example, severe weather such as a major storm could
cause massive delays significantly increasing travel time. The design and constraints of
each of these models take into account the fact that disruptions may alter travel time. We
assume throughout this chapter that the probabilities associated with disruptions are known
or could be estimated.
Each model produced takes the same basic inputs of the network: lists of nodes, arcs
between nodes, demands and supplies, and both time and financial costs of moving along
each arc that connects nodes. The final important input to the models is a list of the possible
disruptions to the network along with the probability each disruption occurs. In Chapter 3
the models are applied to a hypothetical, yet realistic, scenario to obtain insights regarding
accuracy and computability.
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2.2 Basic Shortest Path
This section presents the basic shortest path optimization model. Most of the models in
this chapter build upon this shortest path problem. This model minimizes the time taken
for a shipment to travel from the source node to the destination. In addition, a constraint
is added to ensure that the financial cost to transport the shipment along the path does not
exceed a budget set forth ahead of time; in the standard shortest path problem formulation,
the side constraint of financial cost does not appear, but here it is included due to the fact
that it appears in all other models presented in this chapter.
The basic shortest path problem is well-known and widely researched. It can be solved in
more efficient ways (such as using Dijkstra’s model) (Ahuja et al. 1993), than the linear
integer optimization used for other models described in this chapter. However, Dijkstra’s
model is not capable of incorporating side constraints such as the secondary cost side
constraint mentioned above, or any constraints having to do with risk caused by possible
disruptions. Though linear integer programming is a less efficient optimization model, it
can incorporate these secondary constraints and in problems on the scale of intra-theater
Navy logistical networks, the loss of efficiency is not much of an issue.
Next, we describe the mathematical formulation of the shortest path problem with a side
budget constraint.
INDICES
i ∈ N set of nodes.
(i, j) ∈ A set of arcs.
GIVEN DATA
bi the supply for the shipment at node i. This value is 1 at the source node and -1 at the sink
node, otherwise it is always 0.
T(i,j) cost in time of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
C(i,j) financial cost of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
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budget the maximum allowable financial cost to deliver the shipment from the source node
to the demand node.
DECISION VARIABLES













X( j,i) = bi ∀ i ∈ N (2.2)
∑
(i,j)∈A
X(i,j) ∗ C(i,j) ≤ budget (2.3)
DESCRIPTION
The objective (2.1) in this formulation is to minimize the total time it takes to transport
the shipment from the source node to the demand node. In this formulation, the time to
transport items across each arc is known ahead of time with certainty.
Constraint (2.2) is the flow balance constraint, ensuring that each node has a flow in and
flow out that balance according to their demand.
Constraint (2.3) ensures that the total cost to deliver the shipment from the source node to
the demand node does not exceed the budget allowed.
As mentioned above, the financial cost constraint shown by (2.3) is not standard to the
traditional shortest path network problem. This constraint is important to the Navy supply
chain, as there may be faster options for transporting supplies (usually by air), but they tend
to be far more expensive than the slower options. This budget constraint adds a realistic
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limitation to the speed with which lower priority supplies can be routed toward a destination.
However, since this budget is an input to the model, it may be varied, allowing a decision
maker to learn the marginal improvements in delivery times for supplies if a higher cost
is permissible, which it may be for higher-priority items. This budget constraint provides
more information about potential paths toward a destination that could be taken into account
when planning.
We now begin presenting the models developed to deal with uncertainty with a model that
reacts to disruptions in the network as they occur.
2.3 Reactive Model
One solution philosophy to deal with supply chain disruptions is to optimize the network
as if everything performs normally (that is, no disruptions) and only make alterations to
the plan if something does happen after the optimal path has been created. This reactive
approach neither expects nor anticipates disruptions in the network, but it does recognize a
disruption when one occurs and responds accordingly, providing a new optimal path. We
present a reactive approach in the following subsection.
2.3.1 Re-optimization (ReOpt)
While the reactivemodel is somewhat naïve, it is expected to performwell inmany situations
and require very little computing power even with large networks.
Re-optimization (ReOpt) simply optimizes the flow of a shipment along the arcs from a
source to a demand node while assuming the travel time at each arc are deterministic. Our
model assumes that the travel time is deterministic and is known in advance by the planner.
Therefore, themodel does not predict disruptions, but instead optimizes a path to the demand
node and follows it until some disruption occurs in the network. As the shipment flows
through the network, when it reaches each node, the model checks to see if a disruption
affecting the optimal path occurred while the shipment was moving on the arc. If some
disruption occurred, the model re-runs the optimization model with the new information
about the network. In this case, the node where the materiel is currently positioned at the
time of the disruption then becomes the new source node with a shipment. If the new
optimal path is different after the disruption, then it will follow the new shortest path.
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A visual example of the process for re-optimization is shown in Figure 2.2 below. The top
panel shows the first optimal solution obtained from the shortest path formulation. When
the first transshipment node is reached, a disruption occurs on the arc marked with a red
x. This disruption affects the previously optimal path. The model recognizes that this path
is no longer optimal and solves a new shortest path problem where the arc disrupted is
now impassable, as shown in the second panel. The final panel indicates that no disruption
occurredwhen travelling to the final transshipment node and so no re-optimization is needed.
Figure 2.2. A visual representation of the re-optimization model. Green
arrows represent the updated shortest path from source node to demand
node, and the red X represents a disruptive event.
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As mentioned above, at each node, the network is checked for disruptions and if one has
occurred, the shortest path optimization is run again. The formulation below demonstrates
what occurs when the model detects a disruption and re-optimizes.
In order to formulate this problem, we must first define a function to represent the
shortest path optimization presented in section 2.2 using some generic inputs. We let
SP(b,T, c, budget) be the optimization problem of the shortest path problem for the input
vectors b and T representing the supply state for the nodes in the network and the travel
times for the arcs in the network, respectively, and the vector c represents the financial costs
of crossing each of the arcs. The variable budget represents the current budget to deliver
the shipment from the source node to the demand node. In addition, we let the optimal
travel time of this shortest path problem be obj(SP(b,T, c, budget)) and the optimal path of
this problem be path(SP(b,T, c, budget)).
The first solution SP(b,T, c, budget) is computed to optimally route the shipment through
the network at the beginning of the shipping process. In this first problem, b = 1 for the
initial source node, b = −1 for the demand node, b = 0 for all other nodes, the budget
is the initial budget, and T is the vector of travel times. If no disruption occurs in the
network while the shipment is en route to the demand node, then there are no further steps
and the model operates as a single shortest path optimization problem with the budget side
constraint. However, should a disruption occur along the optimal path while the shipment is
moving through the network, the model then updates the inputs to the shortest path problem
in order to accurately represent the new network state.
For example, if a disruption occurs while the shipment is at node m at time τ, the model
will recognize it and the following will happen: T will be updated to Tnew representing
the new travel times across each arc after a disruption has occurred; bstart = 0 indicating
that there is no longer any shipment at the original source node and bm = 1 denoting the
fact that the shipment is now at node m, and these changes are evident in the new vector
bnew; and budgetnew = budget − budgetused, where budgetused is the total budget that
has been used up until time τ. Finally, the model solves a new shortest path problem:
SP(bnew,Tnew, c, budgetnew). This problem provides an optimal solution to the shortest path
problem in the disrupted network starting from the node where the shipment currently is
and accounting for the budget already spent on routing of the shipment. This problem also
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computes the new estimated total time to reach the demand node from the original starting
node, which is obj(SP(bnew,Tnew, c, budgetnew)) + τ.
2.4 Proactive Models
Another approach to optimize the supply chain under threats of disruptions is to take into
account potential disruptions at the planning stage—treating these threats proactively. In this
section, we present several models following the proactive approach. All models require, as
inputs, probability distributions corresponding to disruptions. The various models address
different perspectives, for example some limit the risk of disruptions allowable on an optimal
path while others minimize the risk of encountering a disruption on an allowable optimal
path.
2.4.1 Risk Management
This section includes implementation of two related formulations of linear programming
problems that solve the network optimization where the effect of a disruption is binary,
and therefore it follows a Bernoulli probability distribution. In other words, the effect of a
disruption is either catastrophic—the corresponding arc is eliminated from the network—or
it has no effect at all. In this formulation, an arc (i, j) has a probability p(i,j) of becoming
unavailable during the journey from a source node to a demand node. The probability
does not depend on the time at which the arc is traversed. The two linear programming
models center around the concept of “risk.” That is, the probability that a disruption will
occur along the path that the model presents as optimal, which would result in a failure to
deliver on time. The first of the two models minimizes the transportation time subject to
a maximum allowable level of risk. The second model minimizes the level of risk subject
to a maximum amount of time allowable before the shipment becomes obsolete. The first
model represents a situation where the shipment is critical and must be delivered at any
time. The second model represents a case where the shipment mission is time-critical
A simple visualization of how these model work can be shown by looking at the example
in Figure 2.3 below. This figure will be referred to again in the following subsections.
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Figure 2.3. A basic network with a starting point at node A and destination
at node F. Each arc has a time to cross, T, and a probability of disruption,
P.
The two following optimization models are derived from models presented previously in
the context of combat modeling (Washburn and Kress 2009).
Minimizing Time Subject to a Risk Constraint (MinT_R)
In this formulation, the objective is to minimize the total travel time on the route from the
source node to the demand node, but the constraint limits the likelihood that a disruption
occurs on the path taken. This linear program is constrained by the network flow-balance
constraints as well as the maximum allowable risk and the budget side constraint.
In Figure 2.3, the shortest path is A → B → C → F, which takes 3 units of time if we
ignore potential disruptions. However, if we assume that the probability of a disruption
along each arc is independent, then this path has just a 65% likelihood to reach F, because
0.65 = (1-0.1)*(1-0.1)*(1-0.2). If we want a minimum of 80% likelihood of reaching node
F without encountering a disruption, then this path is not feasible. Instead, the only path
that meets our requirement is A→ D→ E → F, which takes 6 units of time but has 81%
likelihood of avoiding disruptions.
This simple idea can be generalized to much larger networks and a full mathematical
formulation follows below.
INDICES
i ∈ N set of nodes.
(i, j) ∈ A set of arcs.
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GIVEN DATA
bi the supply for the shipment at node i, it is negative if there is a demand.
T(i,j) cost in time of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
p(i,j) probability of disruption on the arc (i, j).
C(i,j) financial cost of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
maxrisk the maximum allowed probability of using an arc that will be disrupted.
budget the maximum allowable financial cost to deliver the shipment from the source node
to the demand node.
DECISION VARIABLES













X( j,i) = bi ∀ i ∈ N (2.5)
∑
(i,j)∈A
X(i,j) ∗ C(i,j) ≤ budget (2.6)
∑
(i,j)∈A
ln (1 − P(i,j)) ∗ X(i,j) ≥ ln (1 − maxrisk) (2.7)
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DESCRIPTION
Equations (2.4) through (2.6) are the same objective and constraints as presented in the
formulation for the shortest path model in section 2.2.
Constraint (2.7) ensures that the probability of a disruption occurring anywhere along the
optimal path is not greater than the maximum allowable risk.
Constraint (2.7) employs logarithms in order to maintain linearity in its formulation. To
demonstrate why, consider the following: given a solution path Z to this formulation,
wherein X(i,j) = 1 ∀ (i, j) ∈ Z , we can rewrite constraint (2.7) as
∑
(i,j)∈Z
ln(1 − P(i,j)) ≥
ln(1 − maxrisk), note that X(i,j) is no longer in the constraint. All arcs that are not in the
optimal path given, Z , do not contribute to constraint (2.7) and so need not be included.
From here, we can pull the summation inside the logarithm and change it to a product
due to the properties of logarithms, giving us: ln(
∏
(i,j)∈Z
)(1 − P(i,j)) ≥ ln(1 − maxrisk).
Additionally, logarithms are monotonically increasing functions, so there is no need to
change the direction of the constraint. This constraint ensures that the probability of a
disruption along the optimal path is less than maxrisk.
Minimizing Risk Subject to a Time Constraint (MinR_T)
Reversing the roles of time and risk, this model presents a formulation that does not
constrain the riskiness, but rather mandates that the shipment must reach its destination
node by a certain time. This optimization model maximizes the overall probability of
avoiding disruptions subject to the time-criticality constraint and the budget constraints.
For example, in Figure 2.3 the fastest path A → B → C → F is now allowed once
again, but it may not be the optimal path since it is still risky. However, if the decision
maker determines that the shipment cannot take more than 5 days to arrive at node F, then
A→ B→ C → F is the optimal path.
INDICES
i ∈ N set of nodes.
(i, j) ∈ A set of arcs.
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GIVEN DATA
bi the supply for the shipment at node i, it is negative if there is a demand.
T(i,j) cost in time of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
p(i,j) probability of disruption on the arc (i, j).
C(i,j) financial cost of travelling along arc from node i to node j.
maxtime the maximum allowed time that the shipment can take travelling prior to reaching
the destination node, after which it is useless.
budget the maximum allowable financial cost to deliver the shipment from the source node
to the demand node.
α a small coefficient used to penalize paths by their time to delivery.
DECISION VARIABLES













X( j,i) = bi ∀ i ∈ N (2.9)
∑
(i,j)∈A
X(i,j) ∗ C(i,j) ≤ budget (2.10)
∑
(i,j)∈A
T(i,j) ∗ X(i,j) ≤ maxtime (2.11)
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DESCRIPTION
This formulation is quite similar its twin model MinT_R. The only difference between these
two is that the objective in the previous optimization model (2.4) is switched to a constraint
in this model and the constraint in (2.7) becomes the objective.
The objective (2.8), instead of minimizing the total time to deliver the shipment to the
demand location, maximizes the logarithm of the complement of total probability that the
path taken be subject to a disruption (the left hand side of constraint (2.7)). This, in effect
maximizes the probability of traversing the final path without encountering a disruption.
The final constraint takes into account the total time to deliver the shipment to the demand
location and ensures it does not exceed a predetermined limit (constraining the former
objective (2.4) instead of optimizing it).
In addition, the objective (2.8) subtracts a penalty α ∗ X(i,j) ∗T(i,j), which grows as the travel
time across the arcs used increases, meaning there is a slight penalty to paths that are longer,
making shorter paths with equal probability of delivery more preferable. This penalty term
is used as a tie-breaking mechanism between multiple risk-optimal paths, and α is very
small, so as not to change the value of the probability of delivery significantly.
2.4.2 Chance Constraints Programming (CCP)
We next formulate a chance constraints programming approach. The model considers the
stochasticity of the travel time along each arc due to the possible disruptions and provides
an optimal route and travel time that may be obtained with a provided level of certainty.
That is, it enumerates routes and corresponding possible travel times that are realized with a
certain joint probability. The model then finds the shortest route that satisfies the minimum
probability requirement. This allows a decision maker to set a minimum probability level
for which the solution provided will be as good or better. For example, if the probability
threshold specified by a decision maker is 0.8, and the chance constraints programming
model presents a solution with a travel time of 15 days, then the solution implies that
following that plan will result in a travel time of 15 days or sooner with a probability of at
least 0.8.
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The model requires the input of the joint probability mass function of travel along all arcs.
In practice, we often take marginal probability mass functions for the travel times along
each arc and, assuming independence, multiply the probabilities together to generate joint
probability masses for the travel times. However, this model does not require independence
of arc travel times and can use non-independent joint probability distributions to generate
solutions. The model enumerates all possible combinations of arc travel times for which
the joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) value is at least some probability threshold
and finds the shortest path among the routes that satisfy the threshold.
An example of how the Chance Constraints Programming program works is demonstrated
in the Figure 2.4. Note that arcs (C,F) and (E,F) have random travel times, and the travel
time distribution is listed next to each arc. In this example, for simplicity, we assume that
the travel times across various arcs in the network are independent.
Figure 2.4. An example of chance constraints programming. A basic network
with a starting point at node A and destination at node F with possible
disruptions on arcs (C,F) and (E,F).
Table 2.1 indicates the possible travel time combinations and their CDF probabilities. Note
that in this example, the probabilities of disruptions are independent of each other, and so
the probability is a product of the two CDFs.
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Table 2.1. All combinations of possible outcomes for the network in Figure
2.4 with the cumulative distribution function (CDF) probabilities that the
travel time will be better than or equivalent to the desired outcome.
(C,F) (E,F) CDF







A decision maker specifies the minimum probability for which the solution must be valid.
For example in Figure 2.4, if the minimum probability threshold is 0.8, then the only travel
time valid for this confidence level for the arc (C,F) would be 6, while the arc (E,F) has
two valid times, 2 and 4. The shortest path problem is then solved for these two different
networks. In one network, the travel time for (C,F) is 6 and the time for (E,F) is 2. In the
other network, the travel time for (C,F) is 6 and the time for (E,F) is 4. In practice, however
there is no need to generate the solution for the network with the time for (E,F) equal to 4,
as it is stochastically dominated by the former case. That is, the solution will always be as
good or better in the case of (E,F) requiring 2 instead of 4 as all other arcs require the same
amount of time. The resulting best path is A→ B→ D→ E → F, when (E,F) requires 2
time periods and the total time to reach node F is 5 time periods. This solution is valid with
probability 0.8. Even though the fastest possible path is A → B → C → F when (C,F)
only takes 1 time period and the total time for this path is just 3, this solution is only valid
with probability 0.2 and thus does not satisfy our requirements.
NOTATION AND MATHEMATICAL FORMULAE
We now formalize the steps described in the previous paragraph for a general network. The
formalization requires some tedious notation. For simplicity, we assume the travel times
are discrete random variables for all arcs in the network.
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First, we let τ(i,j) be a discrete and finite random variable representing the travel time on arc
(i, j) ∈ A in our network. This variable, τ(i,j), has a known probability distribution derived
from information sources such as military intelligence or a weather forecast. τ(i,j) can take
values in the set {t1
(i,j), . . . , t
l(i, j)
(i,j) } in which l(i,j) is the number of potential values that τ(i,j)
may take. For example, in Figure 2.4, l(C,F) is 3 and l(E,F) is 2.
Next, we let the time vector tk be an |A|-dimensional vector of one realization of the
variables τ(i,j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ A. That is, tk is a vector of values of one realization for each
variable τ(i,j) across all of the arcs in the network. Since each τ(i,j) can take l(i,j) different
possible values, the total number of tk vectors is the product
∏
(i,j)∈A
l(i,j), so the index k
runs from 1 to
∏
(i,j)∈A
l(i,j). To define tk mathematically for a specific k, we map the index
k to |A| other indices resulting in k(i,j) which is associated with each arc (i,j). The index
1 ≤ k(i,j) ≤ l(i,j) allows us to map to a specific value taken by τ(i,j) = t
k(i, j)
(i,j) . That is we define
tk = {tk(i, j)
(i,j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ A}.
Our next step is to determine if any vector tk dominates another tk ′, as we do not need
to consider dominated time vectors in our optimization since they will always provide
an optimal route that is no better than the time vector dominating them. We say that tk










With this definition, any dominated time vector would never produce an optimal solution
that is better than a time vector that dominates it.
Given a probability threshold β, which represents the minimum probability that the solution
must be robust to, we say tk is β-feasible if and only if P[τ(i,j) ≤ t
k(i, j)
(i,j) , (i, j) ∈ A] ≥ β. That
is, the joint probability that all of the τ(i,j) will be less than or equal to the values stated in
tk must be at least β. We then let the set Sβ refer to the set of all β-feasible tk vectors that
are not dominated by any other β-feasible realizations.
Finally, we solve |Sβ | shortest path problems (formulated in section 2.2) for each realization
within the set Sβ. After all of the problems have been solved, we choose the route associated
with the smallest objective function value (representing total travel time), indicating that it
found the fastest route from the source node to the demand node given that the minimum
probability threshold is satisfied.
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2.4.3 Dynamic Programming
Finally, we implement a more comprehensive proactive approach to optimize the path from
a source node to a sink node. Dynamic Programming is another form of mathematical
optimization that operates quite differently from the linear integer programming utilized in
the othermodels. Dynamic programmingworks by using recursion to enumerate all possible
decision combinations and calculate the values corresponding to each combination. For
the optimization problems considered in this thesis, the combinations are all possible paths
from the source node to the destination node, and the value is the expected total time to
travel along a given path.
Before turning to the specifics of our problem, we first present the structure of dynamic
programs in general and present a simple example to illustrate the concept. Dynamic
programs model a sequential decision process. At each decision epoch, the decision maker
chooses an action, which incurs some immediate cost and then generates another decision
point. Therefore, in order to generally define a dynamic program, there are four components:
a current state, an action choice, the cost of the action, and transition dynamics by which the
action leads to a new state. First, a state is a collection of variables that defines the current
situation of the system of interest, and we denote the state as X . An action is chosen by a
decision maker from a set of feasible actions in each state. We denote the feasible action
set as A and the individual action chosen as a ∈ A. Dynamic programs either maximize
an expected reward or minimize an expected cost; we focus on the cost perspective. At
each decision point, a cost is incurred when a decision is made, and the cost often depends
upon the current state, X , as well as the action chosen, a, and can be denoted as T(X,a).
Finally, after choosing an action, the transition dynamics dictate the next state, where the
next decision is made. That is, after taking action a in state X , the system then moves into
a new state Y (X,a), which is dependent on both the previous state and the action taken; in
general, however, the transition dynamics are not deterministic, and so Y (X,a) is a random
quantity.
In order to solve a dynamic program, we must define a value function, V(X), which is
the minimum total expected cost starting in the original state X . The cost consists of the
immediate cost of taking an action as well as all future costs in the later states.
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V(X) satisfies the following recursive formula:
V(X) = min
a∈A
(T(X,a) + E[V(Y (X,a))])
This value function is the minimum over all actions, a, possible from state X , of the sum of
the immediate cost of a and the expected value of future costs starting with the transition
to the next state, Y . In addition, not every state satisfies the recursive formula, that is, some
states are “base cases” where V(X) is some fixed quantity. These base cases ensure that the
recursion terminates at some point. This model is equivalent to searching through the entire
tree of possible futures and finding the optimal decision at each possible state or future,
creating a contingency plan for each state.
We next show a simple example using a tree to illustrate the different decision points in a
dynamic program:
In Figure 2.5, there are two decision points, labeled Decision 1 and Decision 2. In Decision
1, the two possible actions are A or B and in Decision 2 the two actions are X or Y. In
addition, there is some possibility that the weather may be good or bad when carrying out
the action from Decision 1. Bad weather results in longer total travel times, while good
weather results in shorter ones. The weather probabilities depend upon if action A or B is
chosen. In addition, the time at which Decision 2 is made depends both on the path taken
and the outcome of the weather. The combination of the two decisions and the weather
realization results in the outcome leaves of the tree to the right of the figure.
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Figure 2.5. A basic decision tree created for dynamic programming. There
are two possible periods at which the decisions may be made: at Decision 1
either action A or B may be chosen and at Decision 2 either action X or Y
may be chosen.
We can write the recursive formula for this tree as:
V(1) = min(0.7 ∗ V(2, A,G) + 0.3 ∗ V(2, A,B), 0.5 ∗ V(2,B,G) + 0.5 ∗ V(2,B,B))
In the above equation, V(2,a, w) is the value function at Decision 2, given action a at the
first decision point combined with the outcome of the weather, w.
In practice, for such a simple problem, the solution is found via backward induction starting
at the leaves on the right and rolling the tree back to the initial decision point.
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Figure 2.6 shows the optimal decisions (circled in red), as well as their expected total travel
time cost.
Figure 2.6. A refined decision tree (refer to Figure 2.5) with the solution
shown, as well as the expected value of each decision. The optimal solution
is to choose action A in Decision 1. Then, after resolving uncertainty, if
weather is good choose action Y, but if weather is bad choose action X.
This decision tree visual is important, as it best demonstrates how dynamic programs work.
In simple terms, dynamic programs are a very compact way to solve decision trees that
can be generalized to very large problems. These problems get large very quickly, as can
be seen above, even though there are only two points at which decisions are made, there
are in reality five different possible decisions. A dynamic program solves all possible
combination of decisions, even those which should never rationally be reached. This
generates the possibility of forming a contingency plan of the best decisions to make no
matter what state the system is in, such as the decisions along the branch after taking action
B.
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We next describe the four components of the dynamic program for our specific network
optimization. In our case, the state can be defined as a vector of length two representing the
current location (that is, the node) of the shipment and the current time: X = (i, t). Next,
the action is simply the next node to route the shipment to and the set of feasible actions
is all the nodes neighboring the current node, i: j ∈ Neighbors(i). The cost of the action
is the time to travel from node i to node j at time t: T(i, j, t) = travel(i, j, t). However,
we are dealing with uncertain network disruptions, so the travel time from node i to node
j is a random variable, and this random variable is potentially dependent on the time, t at
which the shipment departs from node i. One reason for this could be that a storm is noticed
forming near node i and is expected to hit the arc, but the probability of it disrupting the arc
will decrease as the storm dissipates. Using the same notation as section 2.4.2, the travel




(i,j)t, . . . ,T
l(i, j),t
(i,j),t }, where l(i,j),t is the number of possible values the random variable
τ(i,j),t can take. Next, note that τ(i,j),t takes value T k(i,j),t with probability p
k
(i,j),t . Finally, we
define L(i,j),t = {1,2, . . . , l(i,j),t} as the set of all possible realizations of the travel time along
arc (i, j) starting at time t.
Table 2.2 refers to a hypothetical scenario for the network in Figure 2.3 to illustrate how
arc travel time distributions can change over time. Each row represents the travel time
distribution for τ(i,j),t across the arc named, while the columns are separated into times
before time 5, and after time 5. While most of the travel times are deterministic, that is
l(i,j),t = 1, some are uncertain and have l(i,j),t = 2.
Table 2.2. A table of the travel time along each arc in Figure 2.3 as they
change over time.
Arc t ≤ 5 t ≥ 6
A-B 4 (p=0.3), 10 (p=0.7) 2





C-F 2 3 (p=0.4), 6 (p=0.6)
E-F 1 4 (p=0.8), 11 (p=0.2)
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Taking node A as being the most west and node F as being the most east, this table
demonstrates a hypothetical storm that is predicted to hit the network on the western side
prior to time 5, and thus the travel times early are uncertain for arcs leaving nodeA.However,
after time 5, the storm has shifted to the east, making the arcs leaving node A no longer
random, but now the arcs entering the eastern node F are subject to disruption and have
uncertain travel times. This shows the way in which the random variables of the travel time
along arcs may change as a function of time.
The transition dynamic to the next state depends on the node the shipment is travelling to,
j, and the travel time to that node: Y (i, j, t) = ( j, t + travel(i, j, t)).
Solving dynamic programs can be computationally burdensome for larger problems, as
dynamic programming determines the optimal actions at each unique decision point. How-
ever, the problems we consider in this thesis are small and do not create any computational
issues.
The two dynamic programming models presented in this section both take the same in-
put related to the possible disruptions in the network. This input shows the probability
distributions of the travel time across each arc at each time due to disruptions.
Dynamic Programming to Minimize Expected Time (DP-Time)
The dynamic programming model minimizes the expected time to reach a given demand
node from a source node in a recursive fashion. For our model, the state for each decision
is not just the current node and time, but also the current total financial cost incurred on the
path so far. This allows an easy way to track the remaining budget and how it changes.
In addition, the base cases are important in order to define how the recursion terminates.
There are three base cases: the first is if the current node for the shipment is the demand
node, the second is if the current time exceeds an allowable maximum amount of time,
and the third is if the current total cost exceeds the budget for routing the shipment. First,
when the current node is the demand node, the expected travel time is 0, as the shipment
has reached the destination and does not need to take any more time to travel. The other
two base cases end the recursion, but the shipment has not reached the demand node and so
they are undesirable. Therefore, we assess a time penalty to the base cases that exceed the
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allowable time or the allocated budget so that they are never chosen by the minimization
function if there is a feasible alternative path.
Similar to the chance constraints programmingmodel in section 2.4.2, the dynamic program-
ming model presented below searches through the possible realizations of the uncertainty.
INDICES
i ∈ N set of nodes in the network.
j ∈ Neighbors set of nodes that are adjacent to a node.
t ∈ Time set of times from time 0 to a maximum time after which delivery of the shipment
is useless.
k ∈ L(i,j),t set of possible realizations of the travel time along arc (i, j) starting at time t.
GIVEN DATA
start the starting node from where the shipment originates.
T k
(i,j),t cost in time of travelling along arc from node i to node j in the realization k at time t.
pk
(i,j),t probability of realization k occurring at time t on the arc from the start node i to node
j.
C(i,j) financial cost of travelling along arc from node i to node j, which is assumed to be
constant across time and possible future.
maxtime the maximum allowed time that the shipment can take travelling prior to reaching
the destination node, after which it is useless.
budget the maximum allowable financial cost to deliver the shipment from the source node
to the demand node.
sink the node where the demand occurs and the shipment is being sent to.
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FORMULATION








(i,j),t + V( j, t + T
k
(i,j),t, c + C(i,j)))) (2.12)
V(i, t ≥ maxtime, c) = 99999 (2.13)
V(i, t, c ≥ budget) = 99999 (2.14)
V(sink, t, c) = 0 (2.15)
DESCRIPTION
The objective (2.12) in this formulation is to minimize the average expected time to move
from any node i at time t to the demand node. This value function has an immediate cost for
the action chosen, which is T k
(i,j),t . As this cost is a random variable, we take the expected
value over all possible realizations of that time. The second term in the value function is
the future cost in travel time to reach the demand node after arriving at the next node j. The
final answer returned from this value function after the recursion isV(start,0,0), which will
provide the expected time to route the shipment from the start node to the demand node,
starting at time 0 with 0 cost incurred.
Constraint (2.13) is a base case that ends the recursion if the shipment will take longer
than the maximum allowable time to reach the destination. It penalizes that path with an
extremely high value so that the model will avoid this outcome if possible.
Constraint (2.14) is a base case that ends the recursion if the cost to deliver the shipment
will exceed the budget while it travels to the destination. Like the previous constraint, it
penalizes that path with an extremely high value so that the model will avoid this outcome
if possible.
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Constraint (2.15) is a base case that ends the recursion if the shipment reaches the demand
node. This base case returns a value of 0, as there is no more time needed to reach the
demand node.
This model determines the optimal action for all decision points in the network. That is, at
any node and time combination, the decision maker obtains the optimal node to travel to
next. This means that it can always provide a full map of the best path to take towards the
sink node no matter what happens.
For example, as shown earlier in Figure 2.6, the optimal actions are computed for all decision
2 alternatives, even the ones generated by choosing action B initially, despite knowing that
action A is the optimal choice for decision 1. That illustrates the concept of the contingency
plan in the decision process of this dynamic programming. If anything goes wrong, even if
an action that is sub-optimal is chosen, the solution to the program still provides information
about the best choices to make afterwards. This demonstrates the strength of the dynamic
programming model for our network routing problem, as it always provides a contingency
plan for the next path to take that may be looked up in the original output, and so no matter
what, a decision maker will be able to find what to optimally do next.
Dynamic Programming to Minimize Risk (DP-Risk)
The final formulation is a slight alteration to DP-Time, where the objective is to maximize
the probability that the shipment will be delivered to the destination before a certain time
(or minimizing the risk that this objective is not attained). Similarly to MinR_T, this model
is useful if there is a deadline before which the shipment must arrive at the demand node.
A delivery after the deadline implies that the shipment becomes useless, but there is little
to no benefit for delivering the shipment earlier as opposed to later if both are before the
deadline.
Instead of summing up the expected time to arrive at the destination node across each arc,
as DP-Time does, this model calculates the product of the probabilities for each arc on the
path. It attempts to maximize that product, which is only non-zero when it is able to reach
the destination node without exceeding the time limit or budget constraints. The product
being maximized is then the probability that the shipment reaches the destination node from
the current location at the current time.
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INDICES
See indices in formulation immediately above.
GIVEN DATA
See given data in formulation immediately above.
α a small coefficient for the penalty term to add a minor penalty to longer routes, meaning
that for routes with equivalent delivery probabilities, those that are shorter are preferred.
FORMULATION






(i,j),t ∗ (V( j, t + T
k
(i,j),t, c + C(i,j)))) (2.16)
V(i, t ≥ maxtime, c) = 0 (2.17)
V(i, t, c ≥ budget) = 0 (2.18)
V(sink, t, c) = 1 − α ∗ t (2.19)
DESCRIPTION
The objective (2.16) in this formulation is to maximize the probability of arriving at the
demand node within a specific time. In this formulation, unlike the value function given in
(2.12), there is no immediate cost or reward, but it has a similar recursive formulations.
Constraint (2.17) is a base case that ends the recursion if the shipment will take longer than
the maximum allowable time to reach the destination. The path exceeded the time limit,
hence there is 0 probability of successfully reaching the demand node within the allotted
time.
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Constraint (2.18) is a base case that ends the recursion if the cost to deliver the shipment
will exceed the budget while it travels to the destination. The path exceeded the budget,
hence there is 0 probability of successfully reaching the demand node within the allocated
budget.
Constraint (2.19) is a base case that ends the recursion if the shipment reaches the demand
node. This base case returns a value of 1, as the shipment has successfully reached the
destination in the allowed time and within the budget. The linear term α ∗ t subtracts a
small penalty for the amount of time used to reach the demand node. Again, as in equation
(2.8), α is very small and used in a tie-breaking mechanism to force shorter routes.
2.4.4 Model Taxonomy
As seen in the titles of the preceding sections, the six models were given shorter names.
The list of names is summarized in Table 2.3, along with the corresponding objectives and
section numbers.
Table 2.3. Names of all of the six models formulated through this chapter
as well as the section where they are formulated and their objective
These names are used throughout the remainder of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3:
Case Study: Philippines in 2032
In this chapter we implement the six models described in Chapter 2, by applying them to a
scenario in the Philippine sea. The Global War 2030 scenario was developed for the Naval
Postgraduate School’s Joint Campaign Analysis course (Kline 2019). Set two years after
the outbreak of hostilities, this scenario represents a conflict in the Pacific theater between
the U.S. and allies against a capable adversary. The opposing forces greatly outnumber
the U.S. and allied naval forces and there is significant attrition of combat forces. In this
scenario, the U.S. is maintains a forward presence and is preparing for an assault on the
island of Natuna Besar, which is held by the opposition. Using this scenario and its resupply
implications, we compare how these models perform.
3.1 Background
In this scenario, the Philippines contains several U.S. installations such as forward command
centers, anti-ship cruise missile installations, air defense sites, and expeditionary air fields
along the first island chain. These are important locations for the campaign, which requires
a continuous stream of replenishment supplies. Materiel is routed through the SLOCs
and ALOCs of the theater, from Hawaii through the large port locations of either Cebu or
Manila. From Cebu or Manila, supplies are further distributed in the theater across the
islands to end users. All steps of this supply chain use multiple delivery methods, which
may have differing times to delivery, risks, or costs of use.
Figure 3.1 presents a satellite view of the Philippines through which supplies are distributed
after coming from Hawaii (not pictured) approximately 4,500 nautical miles to the east.
39
Figure 3.1. A satellite view of the Philippines. Note that the straight
line distance from the northern extent to the southern extent of the
country is more than 800 nautical miles. Photograph courtesey of
Google Inc. https://earth.google.com/web/@11.72151323,124.35072857,
141.58594261a,2405289.42126811d,35y,0h,0t,0r
Disruptions to the supply chain may occur randomly during the delivery process from
Hawaii to the installations at any step. Weather threatens to disrupt the network, especially
on the travel between Hawaii and Cebu, due to the prevalence of tropical cyclones in the
western Pacific Ocean. Section 1.2 of this thesis, discussing disruptions, presents more
in-depth data about the number and severity of storms that develop, especially during the
typhoon season. In addition, there are other natural events that are not uncommon, such
as volcanic eruptions on the ring of fire in that area and various other weather patterns
and storms that can slow shipping. Also, disruptions may occur due to random adversarial
engagements in contested areas.
The supply network we examine appears in Figure 3.2 below. The installations are in the
locations of Puraran, Bontoc, Mindoro, Puerto Princesa, Butuan, Zamboanga, and Davao.
All of these locations may also be transshipment nodes in the network, and many of the arcs
actually represent two methods of delivery: air and sea, which have their own benefits and
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drawbacks. These two different methods of delivery differ in their financial cost, delivery
time, and sensitivity to disruptions.
Figure 3.2. A notional network representing location in the Philippines that
must be resupplied. Most arcs in the network represent both air and land
assets, unless the location in question is landlocked.
In order to more easily demonstrate the travel time and cost for each arc in the network,
Figure 3.2 is split into two figures, 3.3 and 3.4, which represent the SLOCs and ALOCs in
the network, respectively. The two figures present the financial cost to cross an arc in cents
per pound (C) and the travel time along an arc in days (T). The values for travel time are the
baseline values, without any disruptions, and we assume that the cost for crossing an arc is
not affected by disruptions.
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Figure 3.3. The arcs of SLOCs between the nodes in the network shown in
Figure 3.2 in the case of no disruptions. Note that the locations of Bontoc
and Butuan are isolated, as they are landlocked. The costs (C) and travel
times (T) for the arcs are shown next to them. The units of cost are cents
per pound of materiel while the units of time are days.
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Figure 3.4. The arcs of ALOCs between the nodes in the network shown in
Figure 3.2 in the case of no disruptions.The costs (C) and travel times (T)
for the arcs are shown next to them. The units of cost are cents per pound
of materiel while the units of time are days.
As mentioned before, the times in all of the SLOCs and ALOCs are measured in days
and include time to stage the shipment in the location for debarking the node, loading the
shipment onto the logistics asset, delivery to the next node, and offloading the shipment
once the destination has been reached. In addition, the times take into account current
standard length of delay, of 1-3 days, due to customs clearance processes (Diffey and Beck
2012). This is the reason why transporting by air may take longer than one day without
disruptions.
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The costs for transporting goods along arcs are calculated by first determining the cost of
flight from Hawaii to the Philippines in a method consistent with the study in Diffey and
Beck (2012). This method assumes a constant operating budget of $5,000 per hour and
constant flight speed of 350 knots for a KC-130J. This results in an expected cost of $6.69
per pound to fly the materiel from Hawaii to the Philippines using the average KC-130J
payload from real world flights (Diffey and Beck 2012). The cost of flying the supplies
across the Pacific Ocean is expected to be ten times the cost of shipping by sea, giving a
cost of $0.67 per pound to ship the materiel from the Hawaii to the Philippines. In the same
way, the cost of flying the shipment among the islands is maintained to be 3-4 times the
cost of shipping it on the same route, depending on the geographical distance between the
two locations. These ratios can be adjusted based on the specifics of any network used for
implementation of the models given.
3.2 Implementation
In order to compare the performances of the six optimization models described in Chapter
2, we implement them upon the network, shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, when it is
exposed to several possible disruptions. In order to do this, we present three disruption
scenarios representing realistic threats to the supply network both between Hawaii and the
Philippines as well as among the islands themselves.
Recall that the six models presented in Chapter 2 and summarized in Table 2.3 are: (1)
ReOpt, (2) MinT_R, (3) MinR_T, (4) CCP, (5) DP-Time, and (6) DP-Risk. The first model
is a reactive model, while the rest are proactive. As the probabilities of disruptions do not
change with time, the reactive model always takes the baseline shortest path; the expected
time to deliver the supplies is calculated with that knowledge. The proactive models treat
probability analytically and therefore they generate deterministic results.
While there are differences among the six models, several of them share similar charac-
teristics allowing them to be compared to one another. For example, both MinR_T and
DP-Risk are constrained to deliver the supplies within a user-defined time period. MinR_T
maximizes the probability of delivery to the demand node without any disruption on the
route, while DP-Risk maximizes the probability of completing the delivery before the dead-
line. Though DP-Risk takes a more nuanced view than MinR_T, recognizing that not all
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disruptions are catastrophic, the resulting optimal routes and probability of a successful
mission completion can be compared to see the relative effectiveness of the models in
different scenarios.
Similarly, all the other fourmodels: ReOpt; CCP;MinT_R; andDP-Time, minimize the time
to deliver the shipment to the demand location. In particular, both MinT_R and CCP ensure
that the solutions are attained with probability that is not lower than a certain probability
threshold, thus allowing more direct comparisons more easily. In the same way, ReOpt and
DP-Time output expected times to deliver the shipment to the demand locations, making
their optimal objective values comparable.
For the case studies, we also implement different values for some of the constraints in order
to see how each model’s performance changes under different conditions set by decision
makers. For MinR_T and DP-Risk, the two deadlines examined are 20 days and 30 days.
In the case of MinT_R and CCP, which both take probability thresholds as inputs, the two
thresholds chosen are probabilities of 0.6 and 0.9.
In each case, we model disruptions via discrete distributions. The cases used for imple-
mentation are described below.
The first implementations of these models uses a lower level budget constraint of 400 cents
per pound to deliver the supplies to the demand location. This constraint allows for use of
SLOCs from Hawaii to Cebu or Manila, but not ALOCs due to the high cost per pound
of air transportation. This is followed by some an implementation using a higher budget
constraint to determine the effects of relaxing the budget constraint.
Every model in this thesis is implemented in Python. The linear integer programs in this
thesis are implemented in Pyomo, an open-source software package for modelling (Hart
et al. 2012). In order to solve the linear integer programs and output a solution, all relevant
models utilize the CBC open-source optimization solver.
3.2.1 Base Case
The Base Case is when there are no disruptions. This means that the travel times on the
arcs in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are fixed with certainty. This case is presented as a base
for comparison. Obviously, in this case, all six models result in the same outcome which
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is obtained from the model in Section 2.2. Table 3.1 presents the duration of the time to
deliver the supplies along the shortest route for several different destination nodes. In this
implementation, we assume a maximum budget of 400 cents per pound of cargo, allowing
use of air delivery within the islands, but requiring the slower sea delivery from Hawaii to
the Philippines.
Table 3.1. Time in days to deliver a shipment from Hawaii to each of the
customer nodes in the Base Case using a budget of 400 cents per pound.
Below we see the optimal routes for the Base Case. Note that supplies travelling to Bontoc,
Puraran, and Mindoro first ship to Manilla when sent from Hawaii to the Philippines, while
supplies destined for Puerto Princessa, Zamboanga, Butuan, and Davao go to Cebu at first.
Delivery to Mindoro, Butuan, and Davao requires one extra transshipment trip.
Shortest routes:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Puerto Princesa
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Zamboanga
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Zamboanga→ air → Butuan
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Zamboanga→ air → Davao
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3.2.2 Case 1
In Case 1 we assume disruptions can only occur while travelling from Hawaii to Cebu or
Manila. This case implies that disruptions may only affect the long SLOCs and ALOCs
from Hawaii to the Philippines. Possible disruptions fitting this description include a
tropical depression that has a chance of developing into a large tropical cyclone storm
directly affecting the route of travel, which will result in taking several days to sail around to
avoid it. The forecast used in this case suggests that disruptions are considered to be rather
improbable, but could severely impact logistics support in the area.
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 demonstrate the arcs that are subject to disruptions, using red
dashed lines to highlight them. The data about the possible disruptions on the arcs from
Hawaii to Cebu and Manila are given in Table 3.2. The time entry in the first column in
Table 3.2 is the baseline travel time with no disruptions, the same travel time as is used in
section 3.2.1.
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Figure 3.5. The arcs of SLOCs between the nodes in the network shown in
Figure 3.2. The arcs that are subject to disruptions in Case 1 because of
weather conditions are shown as dashed lines, between Hawaii and the two
nodes: Manila and Cebu.
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Figure 3.6. The arcs of ALOCs between the nodes in the network shown
in Figure 3.2 and using dashed lines to represent arcs that are subject to
disruptions in Case 1 because of weather conditions are shown as dashed
lines, between Hawaii and the two nodes: Manila and Cebu.
Table 3.2 presents the distribution of travel times along the two arcs that are subject to
disruptions in Case 1. In this case, there is probability of 0.9 that no disruption occurs on
the SLOC from Hawaii to Cebu and probability 0.75 that no disruption occurs on the SLOC
from Hawaii to Manila. The possible disruptions along the ALOCs from Hawaii to the
Philippines are not included in this table since those arcs are infeasible due to the budget
constraint in all models.
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Table 3.2. Distributions of travel times along arcs subject to disruption in
Case 1. Note that the probabilities across each row, representing a single
arc, sum to 1.0.
To present the results, the six models are separated into two families: those that minimize
the time to deliver supplies to the demand locations and those that maximize the probability
that a shipment reaches a demand location within a deadline. The models that minimize the
travel time are ReOpt, MinT_R, CCP, and DP-Time. These four models optimize the route
through the network with the time values given in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 as well as Table
3.2. MinR_T and DP-Risk maximize the probability of a successful mission completion.
The two risk management models: MinT_R and MinR_T, do not take as input arc travel
time distributions as in Table 3.2. These models only consider a binary impact on the arcs:
whether the arc is disrupted or not. To account for this, we reduce the distributions in Table
3.2 to a Bernoulli random variable. The “Time 1” column in Table 3.2 corresponds to the
probability of no disruption and the complement is the disruption probability. For example,
Table 3.2 shows that the probability that the sea arc from Hawaii to Cebu is not disrupted
is 0.9, and hence the disruption probability is 0.1. The travel times used in MinT_R and
MinR_T are the baseline times in the “Time 1” column of Table 3.2; the disruption travel
times play no role.
Since each trip takes a potentially disrupted route from Hawaii to the Philippines, the
models do not distinguish themselves significantly. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the
objective values for implementation of the six models on Case 1.
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Table 3.3. Time, in days, to deliver supplies from Hawaii to each customer
node in Case 1 for models that minimize time.
Table 3.4. Results of maximized probability (from 0.0 to 1.0) to transport
cargo from Hawaii to each customer node in Case 1, within 20 or 30 days.
Both MinT_R and CCP produce the same optimal routes with equivalent objective values
in this case, as they both must cross one of the two disrupted arcs, so they are both limited
by the probability of disruption along those two arcs.
ReOpt produces expected total travel times that are quite close to those given by the other
three time optimization models, due to the low probability of running through one of the
disruptions by naïvely assuming that it will not be disrupted. DP-Time generates similar
values for expected time to deliver the shipment as many of the other time optimization
models, as there is no way to avoid the disrupted arcs. In fact, DP-Time and ReOpt produce
equivalent results in this case because they both take the Base Case routes from Section
3.2.1. Because all of the possible routesmust pass along routes that are subject to disruption,
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the models are similar. The slight differences in objective values are due to the more risk
cautious models taking slightly more indirect routes to lower risks of disruptions.
Regarding MinR_T and DP-Risk for which the results are included in Table 3.4, MinR_T
always presents a probability of 0.9 due to that being the probability of no disruptions
occurring on the SLOC from Hawaii to the Cebu, while the probability of no disruption
on the SLOC from Hawaii to Manila is lower at 0.75, and the shipment must go through
one of the two. Interestingly, for DP-Risk, the extra 10 days given in the 30 day deadline
increases the probability that the shipment will reach the demand node to 1 for all of the
locations. In this case, the supplies can always travel through Cebu first, which yields a
worst case travel time of 21 days, allowing enough time to arrive at any of the destinations.
This indicates that that a more relaxed deadline constraint can increase the probability of a
successful mission up to certainty.
Some of the optimal routes generated by each of the models are presented in the following
subsections. However, we do not present any routes for ReOpt, as the routes are always the
same as those presented in the basic shortest path implementation in the Base Case. This
is because for the cases in this chapter, the travel time distributions do not vary in time.
Therefore, even if a disruption does occur, moving forward in time, each arc still has the
same travel distribution, and thus ReOpt would generate the same path after the disruption.
If the travel time distributions varied over time, ReOpt’s optimal route would depend upon
the specific realization of disruptions and travel times.
MinT_R
The optimal routes for this model depends upon the probability threshold. For a threshold of
0.9, the supplies must always travel to Cebu first, but a threshold of 0.6 allows the supplies
to take whichever route is most direct. One clear example of this is in the two different
routes to deliver the shipment to Bontoc.
The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.9, with objective value of 17 days,
is:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Manila→ air → Bontoc
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The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.6, with objective value of 16 days,
is:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
The second (shorter) route is the same as the optimal route in the shortest route model
from the Base Case, but that route is infeasible in the case when the probability threshold is
0.9. Therefore, the route to deliver the supplies to Bontoc in the case of the 0.9 probability
threshold must travel to Cebu first by sea, then move to Manila, and then to Bontoc.
CCP
The routes for CCP follow the same logic as those presented for theMinT_R implementation.
The route straight to Manila from Hawaii is infeasible for the case with the 0.9 probability
threshold, so if the shortest route would normally include that, the route must instead travel
to Cebu, wasting a day. Like the route to Bontoc, this principle can be shown in the two
routes for delivery to Mindoro.
The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.9 with objective of 19 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.6 with objective of 18 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
As can be seen in Table 3.3, CCP and MinT_R deliver the supplies to each location in the
same amount of time across both of the different probability thresholds. This is due to the
fact that the routes taken always only travel on one arc subject to disruption, and the SLOC
from Hawaii to Cebu has a 0.9 probability of being undisrupted, making it feasible to both
arcs with the threshold of 0.9, while the SLOC from Hawaii to Manila has a probability of
0.75 to be undisrupted, making it feasible in the 0.6 threshold case.
DP-Time
Because the arc travel time distributions in Table 3.2 do not vary with time, there is one
optimal contingency route for each destination. In this case, the optimal routes correspond
to the Base Case results from 3.2.1, which are also the same routes generated by ReOpt.
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MinR_T
For this model, an extension of the deadline from 20 days to 30 days does not change the
probability of mission success, as shown in Table 3.4. A feasible route must cross one arc
subject to disruptions, so the extended deadline does not provide the opportunity to find
a safer, slower route. However, the routes that optimally pass through Manila in the Base
Case will now avoid the more risky SLOC from Hawaii to Manila and instead use the safer
SLOC from Hawaii to Cebu. For example, the route to Puraran differs from the Base Case
shortest route and has a 0.9 probability of delivery without disruption. The Base Case route
takes 16 days, while this new route takes 17 days, but is safer from disruptions than the
original route.
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran
Note that without the added penalty function in the objective for this model presented in
equation (2.8) in Chapter 2, there would be several feasible routes in this case that produce
the optimal probability of shipment; some of these routes may take much more time to
deliver the supply. However, the penalty term in equation (2.8) breaks any ties among the
optimal routes by choosing the fastest of the risk-optimal routes.
DP-Risk
In the case of DP-Risk, the extra time on the deadline does affect the value of the objective,
as the supplies may still arrive to the destination before the deadline, even if a disruption
occurs.
The optimal route under both deadlines to Butuan is:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Zamboanga→ air → Butuan
However, since the implementation with a 30 days deadline could still withstand the most
severe disruption on the SLOC from Hawaii to Cebu and still have time to deliver the
shipment to Butuan, its value function is 1.0 instead of 0.9, as in the implementation with
the 20 days deadline. This is because in the worst-case scenario of taking this route, the
total travel time to Butuan is 25 days, well within the 30 days deadline. Like in MinR_T, the
addition of the time component penalty in the value of delivery for this model, presented
in equation (2.19) in Chapter 2, allows it to output a route that is the most time efficient
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of the routes that are optimal. Without this penalty, the model would view there to be no
benefit from going straight to the demand location over moving back and forth between
transshipment nodes, wasting time and money.
Future work on MinR_T and DP-Risk models may look into addition of yet another penalty
term for using money, even under the budget, in order to find routes that may be both time
efficient and monetarily efficient.
3.2.3 Case 2
Case 2 represents a possible degradation of the ability to use air assets to deliver supplies
among the islands once the supplies have reached Cebu or Manila. The implication is that
there is some weather pattern making air traffic quite uncertain, while most sea routes may
still be used relatively freely among the islands. This may be due to large amounts of low
fog, or thunder strikes making the possibilities of takeoff from an airfield quite uncertain.
As in Case 1, the SLOCs from Hawaii to Manila and Cebu could still be disrupted. Figure
3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the arcs subject to disruption in Case 2.
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Figure 3.7. Sea lines of communication between the nodes in the network
shown in Figure 3.2. The dashed lines represent arcs that are subject to
disruption in Case 2 by weather conditions, specifically the arcs from Hawaii
to Manila or Cebu.
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Figure 3.8. The arcs of ALOCs between the nodes in the network shown in
Figure 3.2. The dashed lines indicate the arcs that are subject to disruptions
in Case 2 from weather conditions, specifically 7 different arcs.
In Table 3.5, the probability distributions of the travel times along each of the vulnerable
arcs are presented.
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Table 3.5. Distributions of travel times along arcs subject to disruption in
Case 2. Note that the probabilities across each row, representing a single
arc, sum to 1.0.
The possibility of disruption of short distance flightsmay require thatmost of the distribution
of supplies among the islands be performed by sea, extending the timeline by a few days.
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 show the results from implementing the models on Case 2.
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Table 3.6. Results of travel time, in days, from Hawaii to each customer
node in Case 2.
Table 3.7. Results of maximized probability (from 0.0 to 1.0) to transport
cargo from Hawaii to each customer node in Case 2, within 20 or 30 days.
Unlike Case 1 and the Base Case, now there are possible disruptions throughout the Philip-
pines, and so there are routes through which the supplies may avoid more dangerous arcs
in order to deliver the supplies without risking disruption. There is still a risk of disruption
on the SLOCs from Hawaii to Cebu and Manila, making the SLOC from Hawaii to Manila
more risky than the SLOC to Cebu. This results in several of the models still choosing
to pass through Cebu instead of Manila, avoiding the more dangerous of the two options.




As in Case 1, the probability threshold determines the optimal route, and in this case there
are even more possible disruptions, making the routes to deliver the supplies longer.
The optimal route to Bontoc using a probability threshold of 0.9 with objective of 21 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Bontoc
The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.6 with objective of 19 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Bontoc
As in Case 1, a difference between the optimal routes for the two probability thresholds
is that the one requiring more security (the threshold of 0.9) sends the shipment to Cebu
first, going a bit in the wrong direction, but reducing risk, while the lower threshold of 0.6
continues to go straight to Manila from Hawaii. The most significant difference between
this case and Case 1 is that the resulting route using a probability threshold of 0.9 sends the
shipment to Puraran via sea to be loaded onto a plane rather than fly directly from Manila
to Bontoc, because takeoff conditions in Manila are poor and so flights to Bontoc are more
uncertain. Notice that due to the negative flight conditions, the probability that the flight
to Bontoc from Manila will be delayed is quite high, and there is no alternative SLOC to
take as Bontoc is landlocked and cannot receive shipments by sea, so a safer ALOC to the
destination must be found in this situation.
It is worth noting that the worst-case travel time flying directly from Manila to Bontoc is
actually 4 days, which occurs with probability of 0.3. The route through Puraran takes
5 days with certainty. So, there is actually a guarantee that flying straight from Manila
to Bontoc would be faster (in a stochastic dominance sense) than going around through
Puraran. Therefore, this route identifies a shortfall in the model. In this case the route is
always faster pass on the ALOC from Manila to Bontoc, rather to first travel to Puraran,
then on to Bontoc. However, disruptions in MinT_R are treated as catastrophic, meaning
that it does not acknowledge the benefit of always using the ALOC from Manila to Bontoc,
due to the likelihood of minor disruptions on that ALOC.
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CCP
CCP does not fall victim to the same shortcomings as the MinT_R model, as it recognizes
how significant each disruption truly can be, and finds shortest routes that are robust to the
probability threshold presented.
The optimal route to Bontoc using a probability threshold of 0.9 with objective of 20 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
The optimal route for using a probability threshold of 0.6 with objective of 18 days:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
Due to the high likelihoods of disruptions, CCP with the threshold of 0.9 produces an
optimal route that still must detour out of its way, directing supplies through Cebu rather
than Manila first. This extends the travel time, but it does not go as far out of the way as
MinT_R. Under the threshold of 0.6, the supplies take the shortest route to Bontoc from the
Base Case. In addition, note that there is some likelihood that these routes will generate
quicker delivery times than those that the objective presents in Table 3.6, due to the nature
of CCP.
DP-Time
In Case 2, the optimal contingency routes are the same as those in the Base Case and
therefore ReOpt, despite to the likely disruptions to air travel.
One interesting result is the route generated for Bontoc with an expected travel of 18.5 days.
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
This route is the same as the Base Case route, and thus the same route as ReOpt takes, which
is why their expected travel times are equivalent. Unlike MinT_R, which routes the supply
to Puraran before flying them to Bontoc due to the high risks of disruptions on the flight
fromManila to Bontoc, DP-Time recognizes that the flight to Bontoc, despite the probability
of disruption, still has the lower expected travel time rather than going through Puraran. So,
DP-Time produces a different route that does not require an additional transshipment.
This route is in agreement with the one generated by CCP with the probability threshold of
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0.6, while the CCP result with a probability threshold of 0.9 takes a safer route than this.
This observation indicates the benefit of looking at the results of several different models.
DP-Time inherently uses an expected value metric to solve for the optimal route through the
network, and thus places low weight on low probability events. Other models such as CCP
and MinT_R do not weight the outcome of a disruption based on its probability, but instead
consider the probability of the disruption itself and determine if their results may be robust
to it.
MinR_T
In Case 2, unlike in Case 1, an extension of the deadline from 20 days to 30 days does
change one result, as there are slower options with less risk. Like most of the models in
this case, the difference lies in the route to Bontoc, as it is the destination around which
disruptions are most likely.
The route to Bontoc for the case with a deadline of 20 days produces a route with 0.75 prob-
ability of avoiding a disruption and a total travel time of 19 days assuming no disruptions:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Bontoc
While the route for the deadline of 30 days with a probability of avoiding disruptions of 0.9
is 21 days assuming no disruptions:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ sea→ Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Bontoc
Note that the difference between the two is that the one with the deadline of 30 days travels
to Cebu before Manila from Hawaii, as mentioned in Case 1 that is the safer trip. The
route generated by this model is also the same route generated by MinT_R with probability
threshold of 0.9.
DP-Risk
As in Case 1, the additional time for the deadline increases the probability that the shipment
can be delivered to the demand location by the deadline to 1, meaning that all of the nodes
in this network can be reached if given 30 days to arrive.
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The optimal route to Bontoc which has a probability of 0.9 of delivering the shipment within
the deadline of 20 days and a probability of 1 for the deadline of 30 days is:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
The model chooses the same route for both of these deadlines, but the extended deadline
allows certainty that the supplies will arrive on time. This route is the same as the route
generated by CCP with the probability threshold of 0.9. It is a slightly safer alternative to
the one given by DP-Time and CCP with probability threshold of 0.6. However, as we can
see, it avoids the very out of the way routes given by MinR_T and MinT_R routes, due to
the simplification of their concept of risk as a catastrophic outcome.
3.2.4 Case 3
Case 3 represents a major storm, perhaps one of typhoon strength and size, expected to make
landfall on the northern island and representing a high probability of disruption on either
sea or air transportation. The southern islands are minimally affected, and it is assumed that
transit in those areas are undisrupted and therefore can continue as planned. In addition, the
SLOCs from Hawaii to Cebu and Manila are not subject to disruptions in this case either.
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Figure 3.9. The arcs of SLOCs between the nodes in the network shown in
Figure 3.2. The dashed lines indicate arcs that are subject to disruptions in
Case 3 from weather conditions, note that the destinations at the top of the
network are most subject to disruptions.
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Figure 3.10. The arcs of ALOCs between the nodes in the network shown
in Figure 3.2 and dashed lines representing the arcs that are subject to
disruptions in Case 3 from weather conditions.
While Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 may not look like a large portion of the network is
disrupted, viewing the data in Table 3.8 demonstrates that these disruptions are quite severe
and lead to several different values for the distribution of times along the affected arcs. The
probability distribution of arc disruptions appear in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8. Distributions of travel times along arcs subject to disruption in
Case 3. Note that the probabilities across each row, representing a single
arc, sum to 1.0.
In Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, we see that MinT_R finds no route with at least a 0.9 minimum
probability of arriving undisrupted for destinations Bontoc and Mindoro.
Table 3.9. Results of travel time, in days, from Hawaii to each customer
node in Case 3. * INF indicates a linear program that becomes infeasible,
because the constraints cannot be satisfied.
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Table 3.10. Results of maximized probability (from 0.0 to 1.0) to transport
cargo from Hawaii to each customer node in Case 3, within 20 or 30 days.
We note that the only route changes from the Base Case are for Bontoc, Mindoro, and
Puraran. Bontoc and Mindoro are surrounded by disruptable arcs, which prevents these
nodes from fully avoiding disruption. Puraran, however, sees a slight increase in travel time,
from 16 to 19 days, and it is reachable before both 20-day and 30-day deadlines. This is
because Puraran, despite being near the major storm, is able to receive supplies via Puerto
Princesa. This effectively circumvents the disruptions for Puraran, so even though cargo
may take a more indirect route to Puraran than in the Base Case, it does not travel over any
arcs subject to disruption, except in ReOpt model.
MinT_R
Unlike the previous cases, in Case 3 the likelihood of disruption is high along certain arcs
that the constraint of the limit of acceptable risk inhibits some destination nodes. This
only occurs for Bontoc and Mindoro when the probability threshold is 0.9, which means
there is no route with a risk of disruption less than 0.1. This demonstrates one shortfall of
MinT_R as compared to CCP, which has a similar structure, because in MinT_R disruptions
are viewed as binary, therefore some key information about the probability distribution of
disruptions could be missed.
Here, using MinT_R and 0.6 probability threshold, we see a route to Bontoc, the destination
most affected by the storm, with an anticipated travel time of 22 days:
Hawaii → sea → Cebu → air → Puerto Princesa → air → Puraran → air →
Bontoc
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Note that this route seems indirect compared to the Base Case. In a situation such as Case
3 with many disruptions, if there is a feasible route, the model does quite well at avoiding
high-risk routes.
CCP
As mentioned in the MinT_R section, the major benefit of CCP in this case is that it will
provide a route that supports the given probability thresholds, if likely to be disrupted. If
the probability threshold that a decision maker sets is too high to avoid all disruptions on the
way to the demand node, CCP still provides routes and optimal travel times for the specified
threshold.
Here we see a route produced by CCP to Bontoc using a 0.9 probability:
Hawaii → sea → Cebu → air → Puerto Princesa → air → Puraran → air →
Bontoc
The objective value is 27 days, meaning that with probability 0.9 the supplies will be
delivered in 27 days or possibly less. This is the same route as is provided in MinT_R with
a probability threshold of 0.6, and it is the same route provided in CCP with a probability
threshold of 0.6 with an objective vale of 22 days. The reason for this is that this route is by
far the safest route from Hawaii to Bontoc, as disruptions can be avoided altogether from
Hawaii to Puraran, and then only one arc remains to reach Bontoc. Though this last arc may
be disrupted, it is still the best choice to fly along. This shows a consensus among these two
models about the best route to take to ensure that their risk constraints are met. As can be
seen in Table 3.9, in Case 3 the two destinations most affected by the disruptions (Bontoc
and Mindoro) are not feasibly reached due to the constraints in MinT_R with a threshold
of 0.9, while CCP is able to plot a route to Mindoro that takes no more than 28 days and a
route to Bontoc taking no more than 27 days with the same probability. This problem arises
due to the high likelihood of moderate disruptions, making the baseline travel times along




In Case 3, DP-Time yet again demonstrates an interesting behavior similar to the one
described in Case 2. This behavior is shown by the route below which has an expected total
travel time of 21.8 days.
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
Interestingly, the optimal expected time to deliver the shipment to Bontoc using the highly
vulnerable ALOC from Manila to Bontoc is still the lowest among the possible routes.
Despite the wide variation in travel times along that ALOC, the average total travel time is
still the lowest, making it optimal for this model. Due to the risk constraints of MinT_R and
CCP, they appear to need to go too far out of the way to ensure their probability thresholds
are satisfied and end up taking routes that are slower on average. This is yet again the same
route to Bontoc as is given in the Base Case.
Asmentioned in Case 2, this once again highlights the importance of observing the results of
different models, as expected value may not always be the best metric by which to measure
the performance of the route when confronted with low-likelihood, but high cost events.
Unlike Cases 1 and 2, DP-Time does not produce the same routes as ReOpt in Case 3.
One route in Case 3 that demonstrates how DP-Time avoids risks is the route generated for
Mindoro that takes an expected travel time of 26.0 days.
Hawaii → sea → Cebu → air → Puerto Princesa → air → Puraran → air →
Bontoc→ air → Mindoro
This path is much more out of the way than the Base Case route, which ReOpt also takes. As
can be seen from Table 3.9, the travel times for Mindoro demonstrate the largest difference
between the twomodels. The expected travel time for ReOpt is 32.1 days, while the expected
time for DP-Time is 26.0 days, a difference of 6.1 days. The reasoning for this is that the arcs
from Puraran to Mindoro are subject to such extreme disruptions that the arc travel times
may increase many multiple times its baseline travel time with a very high probability (0.9
for the air arc and 0.8 for the sea arc). ReOpt naïvely follows the Base Case route and takes
the ALOC from Puraran to Mindoro assuming it has a travel time of only 2 days, which
only happens with probability 0.1, while it has a travel time of 10 days with probability of
0.6 and 16 days with probability of 0.3, as is shown in Table 3.8. Instead, DP-Time reaches
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Puraran and then travels to Bontoc then to Mindoro, avoiding the extremely risky route
from Puraran to Mindoro.
Case 3 also presents an interesting example of DP-Time’s expected delivery time being
faster than either time from the two CCP threshold objectives in the objectives for travel
time to Bontoc. The delivery times for CCP are 22 days and 27 days for the 0.6 and 0.9
probability thresholds respectively, while the expected delivery time for DP-Time is 21.8.
While the difference in objectives between CCP with a probability threshold of 0.6 and
DP-Time is only 0.2, this is the only case seen in which DP-Time sees a lower expected
travel time than CCP with a 0.6 probability threshold.
MinR_T
As we might expect, in Case 3 extending the deadline (or lead time) from 20 days to 30
days has a major impact on the likelihood of reaching both Bontoc and Mindoro without
encountering a disruption. Extending the threshold makes it four times more likely that
cargo should arrive at the demand nodes without disruption.
The route to Bontoc for the case with a deadline of 20 days and a probability of delivery
before the deadline without encountering disruptions of 0.15 with a total travel time of 16
days without a disruption is:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
While the route for the deadline of 30 days with a probability of deliverywithout a disruption
of 0.6 and a total delivery time without a disruption of 22 days is:
Hawaii → sea → Cebu → air → Puerto Princesa → air → Puraran → air →
Bontoc
The safer trip, which is given with a deadline of 30 days rather than 20 days, is much more
indirect, but as mentioned above it is four times more likely to avoid disruptions on the way
to deliver these supplies. This model shows the benefits of lead time when trying to deliver
supplies through an extremely risky environment and how a decision maker and the Navy’s
supply chain may benefit from earlier planning to deliver supplies.
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DP-Risk
Use of DP-Risk generates different results than MinR_T for some destinations.
The optimal route to Bontoc under the deadline of 20 days with a probability of arrival of
0.55 is:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
The optimal route under the deadline of 30 days with a probability of arrival of 1.0 is:
Hawaii → sea→ Manila→ air → Bontoc
This indicates that the route does not change for DP-Risk with the increased deadline of 30
days, but the added time guarantees that the disruptions will not prevent the supplies from
reaching the destination node. Interestingly, relaxing the deadline constraint in MinR_T
causes the route to avoid this route which is optimal for both deadlines in DP-Risk. This
stems once again from the shortfall of MinR_T assuming that the disruptions are catas-
trophic, when indeed they have quite specific outcomes that may not be very extreme.
3.2.5 Base Case - High Budget
In addition to the implementations provided so far in this thesis, we examine the sensitivity to
increases in the budget constraint allowing use of the ALOCs from Hawaii to the Philippine
destinations of Cebu and Manila. The budget is increased to 1,000 cents per pound, and the
results are provided for the Base Case and for Case 1.
As in the lower budget implementation, the basic shortest route route is implemented on
the Base Case network shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4.These two figures, once again
show with certainty the travel times along each of the arcs in the network. The travel time
to deliver the shipment to each of the demand nodes in the Base Case using a budget of
1,000 cents per pound of cargo is presented in Table 3.11.
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Table 3.11. Results of travel time, in days, from Hawaii to each customer
node in the Base Case, using a budget of 1,000 cents per pound.
The optimal routes for the Base Case are shown below. Note that in this implementation on
the Base Case, all supplies are sent from Hawaii to Manila or Cebu by ALOCs, rather than
SLOCs due to the greatly increased speed.
Shortest routes:
Hawaii → air → Manila→ air → Bontoc
Hawaii → air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran
Hawaii → air → Manila→ air → Bontoc→ air → Mindoro
Hawaii → air → Cebu→ air → Puerto Princesa
Hawaii → air → Cebu→ air → Zamboanga
Hawaii → air → Cebu→ air → Zamboanga→ air → Butuan
Hawaii → air → Cebu→ air → Zamboanga→ air → Davao
3.2.6 Case 1 - High Budget
Once again, the six models are implemented on Case 1, the network represented in Figure
3.5 and Figure 3.6. In Table 3.12, we see the probability distributions of the travel times
the disruptable arcs in this network.
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Table 3.12. Distributions of travel times along arcs subject to disruption
in Case 1 with a high budget. Note that the probabilities across each row,
representing a single arc, sum to 1.0.
Once again, in Case 1 the only disruptions possible are those on the ALOCs and SLOCs
fromHawaii to the Philippines, but in this case the ALOCs fromHawaii to Cebu andManila
are feasible. In Table 3.13 and Table 3.14, we see more results for further analysis.
Table 3.13. Results of travel time, in days, from Hawaii to each customer
nodes in Case 1, using a budget of 1,000 cents per pound.
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Table 3.14. Results of maximized probability (from 0.0 to 1.0) to transport
cargo from Hawaii to each customer node in Case 1, using a budget of 1,000
cents per pound and within 20 or 30 days.
We do not present all of the optimal routes for the high budget implementation, as most
of the model’s results are similar to those for Case 1 with the lower budget constraint, but
instead they take ALOCs from Hawaii to the Philippines, instead of SLOCs.
Interestingly, though, due to the higher likelihood of disruptions along the ALOCs from
Hawaii to the Philippines, as compared to the SLOCs, several models still choose to take
the SLOCs despite the clear travel time advantage of the ALOCs over the SLOCs, even in
the worst case scenario.
For MinR_T, this occurs due to the fact that the ALOCs from Hawaii to the Philippines are
both subject to disruptions with probabilities of more than 0.1 and less than 0.4. This is
exemplified in the two routes to Mindoro.
For the case of a probability threshold of 0.6, the optimal route to Mindoro, taking 8 days
without disruption is:
Hawaii → air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
This compares with the route for a probability threshold of 0.9, which takes 19 days without
disruptions:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
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When implemented with the probability threshold of 0.9, the only feasible route from
Hawaii to the Philippines is the SLOC from Hawaii to Cebu, and so all routes to demand
locations must use this SLOC. However, when using a threshold of 0.6, any of the ALOCs
from Hawaii to the Philippines may be used, resulting in much shorter travel times than
those using the previous threshold.
In addition, MinR_T also chooses to take the SLOCs from Hawaii to Manila or Cebu over
the ALOCs. This is once again due to the assumption of all disruptions being catastrophic,
and the objective of this model being to take a route that avoids as much risk as possible.
The route from Hawaii to Mindoro taken under both deadlines is:
Hawaii → sea→ Cebu→ air → Manila→ sea→ Puraran→ air → Mindoro
For this route, the probability of delivery without disruption is 0.9 and the total travel time
is 19 days without disruptions.
The other four models not explicitly described do take the ALOCs from Hawaii to the
Philippines, which are always faster than the SLOCs taken by the above models, despite
their relative likelihood of disruptions. All of the models examine the threats of disruptions
in various ways and MinT_R and MinR_T generally provide the most conservative solution
routes due to their views of all disruptions as catastrophic.
Data was collected for Cases 2 and 3 with a high budget implementation, but they do not
provide further insight to the reader and thus have been omitted.
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In this thesis we formulate several models to minimize risks and improve delivery times
across a network which may be disrupted. In this chapter we describe criteria that we might
use to compare models, as well as the outcomes of these comparisons. We then discuss
conclusions that we draw from our analysis.
4.1 Criteria for Comparisons
In this section, we discuss similarities between our formulated models and some criteria
for comparing them to determine the benefits and drawbacks of each model. We focus on
two metrics: time and risk. Four of our models (i.e. ReOpt, MinT_R, CCP, and DP-Time)
minimize travel time and two of our models (i.e. MinR_T and DP-Risk) minimize risk.
Within each of these two families of models, we use the DP models as benchmarks to
compare against other models. We do this because the DP models most accurately capture
the stochastic nature of the optimization problem.
There are some differences in how each model represents time and risk. Both ReOpt and
DP-Time use expected delivery time as their objective function. For CCP with a probability
threshold of p, the objective value is the pth quantile of the travel time to deliver the
shipment. This means that CCP finds the fastest route such that there is only a probability
lower than 1 − p that the delivery time will be later than the time generated. MinT_R is
different than the other models in this family because it considers the disruptions as binary,
catastrophic events regardless of their actual severity. This view of disruptions naturally
results in routes chosen being quite conservative. The output of MinT_R is a shortest route
that can be successfully completed with a given maximum probability that a disruption will
occur along the route. This is further discussed in the analysis section.
Regarding the risk minimization family of models, the objective functions are probability of
a successful delivery of the supplies before a deadline. The exact notion of “success” differs
between the two risk models. DP-Risk presents a probability that the shipment reaches the
demand node before the specified deadline. MinR_T gives the probability of delivering the
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shipment before a deadline without encountering a disruption. This distinction is because
MinR_T treats disruptions as binary catastrophic events, and aswith its twinmodel, MinT_R
in the other model family, this model presents some conservative routes as compared to the
DP-Risk model.
In addition to comparing the results of the models, in each family, to the corresponding
DP models, we discuss each model’s relative realism in how they represent and address
the disruptions that the network is subject to. Also, we touch upon each model’s compu-
tational complexity as well as the ease with which one may implement the models using
commercially available software and optimization solving algorithms.
4.2 Analysis
In this section, we discuss the results of the models’ implementations in Chapter 3. We
begin by examining the performances of the time minimization family of models and then
move on to the risk minimization family.
4.2.1 Time Minimization
Realism and Computational Considerations
Each of the four time minimization models differ in their levels of fidelity to reality in the
ways that they model disruptions, and some are far more computationally complex than
others. All linear integer programs in this thesis are implemented in Pyomo and utilize the
CBC commercial optimization solver.
First, MinT_R is likely the least realistic representation of the disruptions among these
models, as it treats all disruptions as catastrophic—presenting very conservative routes as
solutions or, at times, no route at all if the probability threshold is high and disruptions are
sufficiently likely. However, in situations where disruptions really are catastrophic, such as
a weather event that results in the loss of the logistics asset carrying the supplies, MinT_R
is a good option that is true to reality. Where MinT_R lacks in realism though, it makes up
for by being relatively fast computationally, taking only 0.33 seconds to calculate one route
in the implementation of Case 2. An added benefit is that MinT_R is easily implemented
with publicly accessible linear integer optimization solvers.
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Next, CCP is more realistic in its treatment of disruptions, taking into account the full
probability distribution of travel times on each arc affected by a disruption. The downside
is that the implementation of CCP in this thesis deals only with discrete, independent
probability distributions of disruptions on each arc in the network. However, a more robust
and general implementation of CCP is possible. The largest shortcoming of CCP is its
time to calculate each route. Enumerating all possible combinations of network outcomes
and scrubbing through the sets eliminating those below the probability threshold and those
dominated by other outcomes can take a long time. In Case 2, which has the most possible
disruptions, themodel takes 778 seconds to compute an optimal route. It is notable, however,
that the process of finding all the feasible sets of arcs needs only to be performed once.
This set may be used to quickly solve another CCP problem with the same network and
threshold data for another source and destination pair. However, this problem compounds
as the network and number of disruptions grow. A much larger and more complex network
could take an extremely large amount of time to solve.
ReOpt is quite a general approach as it makes no assumptions about the underlying dis-
ruptions. In fact, it is quite realistic for the delivery route to change mid-route should the
path ahead experience disruptions. ReOpt’s results were not that interesting for this thesis
because the routes in Chapter 3 coincided with the undisrupted shortest paths. However,
for more general disruptions, ReOpt will re-solve for the optimal route several times. This
model’s computability is different than the other models, since in implementation it may
require multiple runs of the optimization depending on the occurrence of disruptions, mean-
ing that the run time could differ for any individual trip. However, any one instance of the
problem is similar in complexity to MinT_R. Even though the optimization may have to be
run multiple times due to many disruptions, ReOpt’s computational complexity should not
be too burdensome.
Finally, regarding DP-Time, the only loss of realism in this model is that it treats disruptions
as temporally independent (there can be spatial dependence within the same time period)
with discrete probability distributions. DP-Time uses the expected value of delivery time
as its objective function. For some decision makers this objective may not be the proper
measure of effectiveness in the case where probability considerations are crucial. In such
a case, a percentile approach such as CCP would be more appropriate. DP-Time, in the
implementation used in this thesis, has a very fast run time of less than 0.001 seconds. The
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memoization (storing calculated values in active memory) of routes already solved prevents
repeated calculations of the same route and causes DP-Time to run in pseudo-polynomial
time. However, as the network becomes larger with more possible disruptions, more and
more memory would be required to keep this run time low. This makes DP-Time potentially
unwieldy for use in large networks.
Model Comparisons and Insights
Chapter 3 presents results on three cases of the supply network from Hawaii to the Philip-
pines.
First, the optimal delivery times for ReOpt and the DP-Time coincide in most scenarios.
However, there are some cases where DP-Time clearly outperforms ReOpt and delivers
supplies faster. A major reason for this is that ReOpt ignores the probabilities of disruptions
still to come while initially planning the routes. Because of this, ReOpt decides to take
very risky arcs without any consideration about the consequences. While this strategy is
not always a bad one, as can be seen by the several occasions that ReOpt and DP-Time fully
agree, when the probability of a disruption is quite high and the disruptions are extremely
costly, this reactive approach may result in cases such as we see with Mindoro in Case 3:
quite high travel times that could be avoided by taking another route. The DP-Time model
anticipates the high risk and chooses an alternate route. For example, in Case 3 DP-Time
chooses a route from Puraran to Mindoro via Bontoc instead of straight from Puraran, as
ReOpt does.
Second, in the comparison between CCP and MinT_R, we examine how quickly they
deliver supplies when using the same probability thresholds. The cases that demonstrate
significant differences between the two models are Case 3 and Case 1 with the high budget
implementation. In both of these cases, using a threshold of 0.9 results in major differences
in delivery routes and times between the two models, due to the different ways they treat
disruptions. With a high probability threshold close to 1, MinT_R is constrained from using
arcs even with low probabilities of disruptions, while CCPmay still use those arcs and will if
the disruptions are not so severe that the route becomes non-optimal. For lower probability
thresholds, the two models result in the same outcome, indicating that a higher allowance
for risk can somewhat mitigate the very conservative behavior that MinT_R demonstrates.
In Table 3.13, the routes to all destinations given by MinT_R under the 0.9 threshold take
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significantly longer than those given by CCP.
In Case 1 (Table 3.3), we note that the travel times for DP-Time are slightly longer than
CCP for each destination. This is because there are small probabilities of disruptions that
cause significant delays on the SLOCs fromHawaii to the Philippines which are outliers that
skew the expected value. As discussed earlier, CCP does not account for low-probability
disruptions for moderate threshold levels.
4.2.2 Risk Minimization
Realism and Computational Considerations
Next, we discuss the benefits and shortcomings of the two risk minimization models,
MinR_T and DP-Risk. Both have corresponding models in the time minimization family
and share similar levels of realism and computational complexities toMinT_R andDP-Time,
respectively, in the time minimization family.
MinR_T, like its twin model MinT_R, also has a low level of realism due to its consideration
of all disruptions as binary catastrophic events. It also has a quick computation time of
around 0.3 seconds per route, depending on the deadline constraint. It is easily implemented
on a simple optimization solver.
DP-Risk, like DP-Time, is extremely fast in its current implementation requiring less than
0.001 seconds to run, but the problem may grow quite large, and will take considerably
more time to solve, as the network expands and possible disruptions begin to mount.
Model Comparisons and Insights
Among the two risk minimization models, DP-Risk has several benefits over MinR_T. This
is especially true in cases when there are high probabilities of severe disruptions. The reason
for this is the same shortcoming as its twinmodel, MinT_R, that thesemodels do not take the
full probability distribution of travel times into account, treating disruptions as catastrophic
events. In addition, the high budget implementation exposes a further implication of this
shortcoming in MinR_T, the objective to minimize risk of disruptions supersedes speed of
delivery in the model. The example in the high budget implementation is that MinR_T
always utilizes the SLOCs from Hawaii to the Philippines, even though the ALOCs are
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always faster no matter how extreme the disruption is. This issue does not arise in DP-Risk,
as any route that delivers the supplies before the deadline is equally as favorable, but the
penalty term for extended time selects the fastest of these routes, using the ALOCs.
4.3 Conclusions
These six models have several benefits and drawbacks each unique to their methods of
dealing with disruptions and their process of optimizing a route through a supply chain.
The major pros and cons of each model are summarized here along with their best use cases
in the real world.
Table 4.1 presents each model’s largest strengths and weaknesses.
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Table 4.1. Table of insights about the strengths and weaknesses of each
model formulated in this thesis.
Each model examined in this thesis has its own benefits and drawbacks, many of which are
shown in Table 4.1. This information could all be relevant to a decisionmaker looking for an
effective supply route in a network subject to disruptions. Though there is not one single best
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model to always use, all of the models give different approaches to model disruptions and
present several alternatives. The decision maker can evaluate the various routes presented
by the models and their associated metrics and make a more informed decision about which
model’s solution may be the best route for a given situation.
4.4 Future Work
We propose several avenues for future work that may improve understanding of further
benefits and drawbacks of each of the models formulated.
First, an in-depth simulation analysis on ReOpt could provide more insight into the exact
differences between proactive and reactive approaches. This could be done by analyzing
how each of the different proactive models’ paths actually do given a randomly generated
outcome of the network that ReOpt was simulated on. This would provide more concrete
information for comparisons between the different models’ total travel times despite the
different objective functions each one optimizes.
Next, ReOpt, DP-Time, and DP-Risk should be implemented on an inter-temporal network
with changing probabilities of disruptions to truly expose the different strengths, specifically
those of the DPmodels’ contingency plans. For the case study in Chapter 3 the probabilities
and severity of disruptions do not change over time. Therefore DP-Time and DP-Risk
contingency plans are constant for each node regardless of when the supplies arrive to the
node, this would not necessarily be true if the distributions varied with time.
Another possible subject for future work could be to add a constraint similar to the risk
constraint used in MinT_R to ReOpt’s linear integer formulation. This would create a
reactive model that has proactive traits. Specifically, this new constraint in ReOpt would
help the model avoid the very risky paths that it might take otherwise, leading to very long
travel times due to disruptions. This addition may assist with the drawback of ReOpt’s
naïveté when it comes to arcs with a high likelihood of disruption.
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